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ABSTRACT:
The dissertation is composed of three papers on properties and their relatives. "Second-
Order Predication and the Metaphysics of Properties" argues that giving a happy account
of second-order predication motivates us to identify properties with functions from
<world, time> pairs to extensions rather than with the sets of their instances. "Secondary
Qualities and Centering Features" offers a characterization of the elusive distinction
between primary and secondary qualities. "Appearance Properties" argues that Sydney
Shoemaker's proposal for reconciling intentionalism with the possibility of spectrum
inversion without error fails in its details, but there is a nearby proposal which may well
succeed.
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Second-Order Predication
Second-Order Predication and the Metaphysics of Properties
Introduction
If you're doing systematic metaphysics, problems for, and revisions to, one part
of your theory will tend to have ramifications elsewhere. This paper is about a problem
for Lewis's theory of properties. It's also about what happens to the Lewisian system
when we revise the theory of properties in order to avoid the problem. So I'll be
concerned to do two things in what follows. First, I'll argue that Lewis's theory of
properties has a fatal problem with accounting for second-order properties-the
properties of properties. Second, I'll trace the ramifications of the revision through the
rest of Lewis's system.
1. The Problem
An attractive nominalist strategy is to identify properties with the sets of their
instances-not their actual instances (the property of being round isn't the property of
being blue, even if all and only the round things are blue)-but all of their instances,
actual or not.1 This is the theory that Lewis (1986a, 1983b) endorses. 2
1 Sets, or classes? Well, Lewis says that he means sets (Lewis 1986a:50 fn37). But this runs into problems:
being a set, for example, seems like a perfectly good property, but there isn't (on the standard ways of
doing set theory) a set of all sets. So if properties have to be sets, being a set turns out not to be a property
after all. (Classes run into other problems-being non-self-membered seems like a perfectly good property,
too.) Since I won't be concerned with these problems, and nothing will hang on the set/class distinction in
what follows, we needn't resolve this question here. (Thanks to Vann McGee for pressing me on this.)
2 There are a couple of extremely contentious bits of Lewisian metaphysics that I'm going to treat as if they
were uncontroversial. The first of these is Lewis's modal realism. The other is that some sort of reductive
nominalist theory of properties is right. The sorts of questions that are addressed in the remainder of the
paper will still arise for many philosophers who reject one or both of these theses. First, while the
questions only arise if you're some kind of modal realist, but they don't depend on merely possible worlds
being the big concreta that Lewis takes them to be. Second, while anti-nominalists won't want to identify
properties with set-theoretical entities built out of possibilia, properties still need to be intimately associated
-9-
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It's a straightforward consequence of this theory that things that exist in more
than one world can't have any of their properties accidentally. Here is why not:
Suppose (contra Lewis) that people aren't worldbound-that they exist in more
than one world. Elmer is a philosopher, but he might have been a plumber instead. So
he's only accidentally a philosopher. Though he's a philosopher in the actual world @,
he's not a philosopher in some other possible world w. That is: in @, Elmer has the
property, being a philosopher, while in w, Elmer lacks the property, being a philosopher.
Suppose also (with Lewis, this time) that properties are sets of possibilia. Something has
the property just in case it's a member of the set, and lacks the property just in case it's
not a member of the set. So since Elmer is a philosopher in @, he must be a member of
the set, being a philosopher. Since Elmer is not a philosopher in w (since, in w, he lacks
the property, being a philosopher), Elmer must not be a member of the set, being a
philosopher. So Elmer must both be and not be a member of the same set.
Contradiction.
The reason why this kind of case isn't a problem for Lewis is also
straightforward. Lewis takes philosophers to be worldbound, and to have their modal
properties in virtue of the behavior of their (distinct) counterparts in various other
worlds. 3 And while Elmer can't both be and not be a member of the same set, there's no
problem about Elmer being a member of some set that not all of his counterparts are
members of.
with some such entities. Whatever properties are, they at least need to determine, for example, a class of all
of their possible instances.
3 See Lewis (1968, 1971, 1973:39-43, 1986a:192-263). See also Stalnaker (1968, 1987, 1994) and Kaplan
(1979) for more discussion of counterpart theory.
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Second-Order Predication
Now consider a parallel, though less familiar, case. Elmer has a favorite property.
It's being green. But Elmer is fickle-he might have favored some other property
instead. So being green might not have been Elmer's favorite property. In fact, being
green might not have been anybody's favorite property. So being green is somebody's
favorite property, but it might not have been. Here's another way of saying the same
thing: being green has the property, being somebody's favorite property, but only
accidentally. This is a case of second-order predication-of attributing properties to
properties. More specifically, it's a case of contingent second-order predication-of
attributing accidental properties to properties. Since being somebody's favorite property
is itself a property, it's the set of its (actual and possible) instances. Its instances are
properties, so being somebody's favorite property is a set of properties.
Let @ be the actual world, in which being green is Elmer's favorite property, and
let w be a world in which Elmer (along with everyone else) has turned his attentions
elsewhere. Since being green is somebody's favorite property in @, it must be a member
of the set, being somebody's favorite property. Since being green is not anybody's
favorite property in w, it must not be a member of the set, being somebody's favorite
property. Contradiction. And since properties aren't worldbound and therefore don't
have distinct counterparts in other worlds, counterpart theory can't help us here. 4
So here's the argument: If properties are the sets of their instances, then properties
can't have any of their properties accidentally. But properties plainly can have some of
their properties accidentally-witness being somebody's favorite property, playing the
4 Mark Heller (1998) has proposed a theory on which properties do have distinct counterparts in other
worlds (in response to a very different problem). This sort of theory will, obviously, avoid the problem that
I'm raising here.
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pain role, and being the semantic value of 'red', all of which are accidental properties of
any property that has them. So properties aren't the sets of their instances.5
2. Objections and Responses
Isn't there some sort of paraphrase strategy available that'll make this problem go
away? I don't think that there is. At the very least, there's not one that's worth the
trouble, given that there's another solution available (presented in the next section) that
gives a smooth treatment of the problem cases. Notice that it's a constraint on such a
solution that it deny that any second-order properties are ever had contingently. As long
as there are any accidental second-order properties, properties just can't be the sets of
their instances. So the responses that attempt to retain the Lewisian picture of what
properties are will all be strategies for doing away with accidental second-order
properties and finding something else to do the work of making what look like
attributions of accidental properties to properties come out true, despite the absence of the
relevant accidental properties.
One thing that we might try, in order to make all of the properties of properties
necessary, is world-indexing all of the second-order properties. 6 So there's no such
property as being somebody's favorite property-instead there's a family of world-
5Some more examples of accidental second-order properties: being instantiated, being coinstantiated with
being green, and being the subject of extended philosophical debate. Some slightly fancier ones: the
second-order properties you get by lambda abstraction from statements of contingent natural laws, and the
second-order properties you get by dropping one of the quantifiers over properties in a Ramsey sentence,
like the ones that (we hope) provide the characteristic functional roles of mental properties like being in
pain (being in pain is the property G such that there are properties F1 , F2 ...Fn such that...).
6 Since properties are arbitrary sets of things, there won't actually be a clean distinction between first-order
and second-order properties, since there will be properties that could be had by, for example, both being
green and my desk. These properties actually needn't even be especially weird or unfamiliar: being
mentioned in this footnote seems to do the trick. Still, there will be some properties that can only be had by
particulars, and some that can only be had by properties-call these the pure first-order and second-order
- 12-
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indexed properties, being somebody's favorite property at wj, being somebody's favorite
property at w2, etc. These properties are had necessarily if at all, so we needn't say that
properties have any of their properties accidentally. We can explain the appearance of
having accidental properties by noting that being green has some, but not all, of these
world indexed properties-a fact naturally expressed by saying that being green is
somebody's favorite property in some worlds, but not in others.
This move fails because it assigns the wrong contents to sentences involving
second-order predication. When I say, 'being green is somebody's favorite property',
two things have happened: I've attributed some property to being green, and I've said
something (metaphysically) contingent. But suppose the property I've attributed to being
green is a world-indexed property. Then I haven't said something contingent. What I've
said must be either necessarily true or necessarily false. So since the contents of
sentences like 'being green is somebody's favorite property' are contingent, the second-
order properties attributed in them can't be world-indexed.
properties, respectively. Where it's important that the second-order properties not also be properties of
particulars, read 'second-order property' as 'pure second-order property'.
7 Or even, 'being green is Elmer's favorite property'. I focus on the case of 'quantified' properties like
being somebody's favorite property not because the points only go through for these sorts of properties, but
because showing that they go through for properties like being Elmer's favorite property requires a fair
amount of house-to-house fighting about the details of counterpart theory.
8 It's possible for the objector to make a further move at this point. She could bite the bullet, accept that the
contents of such sentences are necessary, and attempt to explain the appearance of contingency by a
diagonalization strategy. Even if second-order properties are all world-indexed, in different worlds the
predicate 'is somebody's favorite property' will express different properties (in w, it expresses the
property, being somebody's favorite property in w1, in w2 it expresses the property, being somebody'sfavorite property in w2, etc.) and so 'being green is somebody's favorite property' will express different
propositions depending on which world it's uttered in. In every world, the proposition expressed by local
utterances of 'being green is somebody's favorite property' will either be necessarily true or necessarily
false, but since the propositions expressed will be different in different worlds, we will get world-to-world
variation in whether local utterances of 'being green is somebody's favorite property' are true or false. I
think that this move is unattractive. For one thing, it gets the facts about entailment wrong. The content of
my utterance of, 'being green is somebody's favorite property' ought to be entailed by the proposition that
being green is Foghorn's favorite property, but ought not to be entailed by the proposition that Foghorn is a
rooster. If the diagonalizer is right, the content of my actual utterance is necessary, and so is entailed by
everything. (Thanks to Sally Haslanger for discussion of this point.) Anyway, there's another theory of
- 13-
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Another tempting strategy is based on the very plausible idea that the only
accidental features of properties are which relations they stand in to other things. This
suggests a way to avoid the problem-we could get the right sentences to come out true
by exploiting the unproblematic contingent relations between properties and other things,
while denying that they have any troublesome accidental properties.9
Tempting though it is, this strategy doesn't work, because the contingent relations
are problematic-accepting the contingent relations also commits us to accepting the
accidental properties.
It's non-negotiable that there are contingent facts about which relations properties
stand in to other things (including other properties). If we're allowed to move from the
contingent facts about which relations properties stand in to contingent facts about which
relational properties they have, then the jig is up, since the Lewisian theory of properties
can't allow that there are any contingent facts about the properties (relational or
otherwise) of things that don't have distinct counterparts.
We plainly can move from the fact that Elmer is hunting Bugs (that Bugs stands
in the being hunted by relation to Elmer) to the fact that Bugs has the relational property,
being hunted by Elmer (and therefore that he has the property, being hunted by
somebody). And if we can do that, we ought to be able to move from the fact that being
properties-the one in the next section-that gives the sentences the right contents without the fancy
maneuvering. Another move-deny that the semantic values of predicates are, in general, properties, and
take them to be functions from worlds to properties instead. See Stalnaker (1979) for a development of
such a view. (The same kind of move was also suggested by John Hawthorne at an APA session.) Though
this gets the contents (and hence the entailment facts) right, I think that giving up the connection between
predicates and properties is too high a price to pay. (Though Stalnaker offers some interesting principled
reasons for giving up this connection.)
9 This move may look like a non-starter, because of the existence of contingent relations between properties
(being systematically coinstantiated with, being related in lawlike way L to, etc.). Perhaps this really is a
fatal problem with the proposal. It might be, though, that whenever there two properties stand in a
contingent relation to one another, it's because the properties stand in certain contingent relations to
-14-
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green is Elmer's favorite property to the fact that being green has the relational property,
being Elmer's favorite property, and therefore has the property, being somebody's
favorite property. And since it's contingent that being green is anybody's favorite
property, it's contingent that being green has the property, being somebody's favorite
property. Now we have our counterexample to the claim that properties are the sets of
their instances: a property that has a property, and has it contingently.10
Notice that any story we tell in order to avoid attributing accidental properties to
properties will require us to say that the move from relations to relational properties is
illegitimate. We'll be forced to say, for example, that being green can stand in the being
the favorite property of relation to Elmer without having the relational property, being
Elmer's favorite property. I suspect that this is incoherent. But in any event, whether it's
coherent or not, it's a desperate move.
Lewis says some things that suggest a different line of response. In On the
Plurality of Worlds, Lewis says that '[a] universal can safely be part of many worlds
because it hasn't any accidental intrinsics,'11 and '[i]f indeed there are no accidental
worldbound things. In any case, whether this is true or not, there is an independent, fatal problem for the
proposal.
to Here is almost the same argument, cast more formally: Rab is true iff FXx(Rxb)a is true. And
FXx(Rxb)al is true iff a has the relational property that's the semantic value of FX(Rxb)]. So if (a) there are
some contingent sentences of the form Rab where one of the relata is a property, (b) we can do the usual
kind of lambda abstraction on sentences of the form FRabl, then properties can't be the sets of their
instances. (Since we get some contingent facts about the properties of properties.)
The properties we get by this procedure are ones like being Elmer's favorite property, rather than
being somebody's favorite property, but (a) those properties will do just fine as counterexamples (see note
8), and (b) we can also get the 'quantified' properties if we want them by adding another innocent-seeming
step to the argument, in which we existentially generalize before doing the lambda abstraction: FRabl is
true only if By(Ray)1 is true, which is true iff 'Xx[]y(Rxy)]al is true. So in order for FRabl to be true, a
certain object must have the property expressed by F Ax[xy(Rxy)]l
I Lewis (1986: 205 fn6).
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intrinsics to raise a problem, then overlap confined to the sharing of universals seems
entirely innocent'. 12
It looks like the claim is that there's an important difference between accidental
intrinsic properties and accidental extrinsic properties-there's a big problem if would-be
transworld objects (like universals) have accidental intrinsics, no problem if their only
accidental properties are extrinsic or relational. 13
But the mere fact that the relevant properties aren't intrinsic can't make a
difference. The problem is that (a) there are things without distinct counterparts (namely
properties) which plainly have (second-order) properties, and have them accidentally, and
(b) Lewis's theory of properties cannot accommodate this fact. That the second-order
properties are extrinsic is beside the point; the thing that's making the trouble is just that
they're properties. When Lewis says that properties are the sets of their instances, he's
offering a perfectly general theory of properties, not a theory that's only supposed to
apply to some restricted subset of all the properties that there are. The claim that
properties are the sets of their instances is supposed to apply to all properties, not just the
intrinsic ones.
12 Lewis (1986: 205). The other relevant passage is Lewis (1983b: 11, fn5). In these passages, Lewis is
talking about universals, which would be points of overlap between worlds-the very same thing would be
part of more than one world, and not by having different parts in each. This is unlike Lewisian properties,
which are not meant to be points of overlap. They do draw their members from many different worlds, and
so it's natural to say that they have parts in various different worlds (especially for Lewis-see Lewis
(1986b), (1990)). However, at least for first-order properties, a property's part in one world will be wholly
distinct from its part in any other world. But this difference between properties and universals is not
relevant to our concerns. What's important to generating the problem that Lewis is worried about for
universals, and that I've claimed actually arises for Lewisian properties, isn't overlap, but the absence of
distinct counterparts in different worlds. The problem is that universals, being present in more than one
world, are always their own counterparts. So, it can't be that a universal is a member of some set and one
of its otherworldly counterparts is not. This feature-the lack of distinct counterparts-is a feature that
universals and Lewisian properties share.
13 Steve Yablo (1998) says some similar-sounding things.
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In light of this, I think that Lewis's (very brief) discussion of accidental intrinsics
is best understood not as a new line of argument, but as a gesture in the direction of
something like the 'get rid of the properties and make do with the relations' strategy
discussed above.
Summing up: we can't paraphrase away accidental second-order properties
without saying implausible things about the connection between relations and relational
properties and/or assigning the wrong contents to sentences involving second-order
predication. We also can't appeal to the bare fact that the accidental properties of
properties are all extrinsic in order to solve our problem. Fortunately there is another
theory of properties right around the corner, in the same spirit as Lewis's theory, which
handles second-order predication without incident.
3. The Replacement Theory
Perhaps surprisingly, there's no parallel problem for a theory that identifies
properties with functions from possible worlds to extensions (where extensions are just
sets of things). 14
Here's how the functions account handles the fact that being green is somebody's
favorite property, but only accidentally: At @, being green is somebody's favorite
property. At w, it's not. The second-order property, being somebody's favorite property,
is a function that, for each world taken as argument, delivers as value an extension, which
will be a set of properties. Call the value of being somebody 's favorite property taking @
14 This is potentially surprising because it's tempting, if you're only thinking about the properties of
worldbound things, to take the two theories to be notational variants. Of course, Lewis didn't take them to
be mere notational variants. One of the problems about offering Lewis a properties-are-functions theory as
- 17-
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as argument 'A', and call the value taking w as argument 'B'. Since being green is
somebody's favorite property in @, being green must be a member of A. Since being
green is not anybody's favorite property in w, being green must not be a member of B.
No problem. All we get from this is the unsurprising result that A•B; that being
somebody's favorite property delivers different extensions for @ and w.
So while there's a problem about contingent second-order predication if we take
properties to be the sets of their possible instances, there's no problem if we take them to
be functions from worlds to extensions. I conclude that Lewisians should take properties
to be functions from worlds to extensions, rather than the sets of their possible instances.
This lets us avoid the problem about accounting for the accidental properties of
properties while still telling a uniform story about first-order and second-order
predication: something has a property F at a world w iff it, or its counterpart at w, is a
member of the value of F taking w as argument. It has F essentially iff it has F at every
world (or at every world at which it has a counterpart), and it has F accidentally iff it has
F at @, and has the complementary property (it's in the antiextension of F) at some other
world.15
We can still build properties out of antecedently familiar things, and we can still
have plentiful, arbitrary, gerrymandered properties, and a distinction between the more
and less natural properties. It's as easy to have arbitrary, gerrymandered functions as it is
to have arbitrary, gerrymandered sets of things, so there's no difficulty in accommodating
extremely unnatural properties. There's also no more of a problem singling out the
a way to avoid the problem about contingent second-order predication is that he offers an argument against
identifying properties with functions in Lewis (1986a). We'll get to this in the next section.
- 18-
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natural properties if we take them to be functions than if we take them to be the sets of
their instances. The natural properties can still be the ones sharing of which makes for
genuine similarity. 16
So taking properties to be functions from worlds to extensions does away with the
problem about contingent second-order predication, and preserves the benefits of Lewis's
theory. So far, so good.
4. Functions, Properties, and Relations
Despite these benefits, there's a worry about the acceptability of this substitute
theory of properties. Lewis offers an argument that we ought not to take properties to be
functions from worlds to extensions. Here I paraphrase his argument:
It's tempting to say that there are properties that things don't have or lack
simpliciter, but only relative to this or that other thing. Since I'm thirsty at some times
and not at others, I don't just have (simpliciter) the property being thirsty. Instead I have
the property being thirsty relative to some times, but not relative to others. Since the road
is surfaced in some places but not in others, the road doesn't have (simpliciter) the
property, being surfaced. Instead it has the property being surfaced relative to some
locations, but not relative to others. Since Ted is the father of Fred, but not of Ed, he
doesn't have (simpliciter) the property, being a father. Instead he has the property being
a father relative to some people (like Fred) but not relative to others (like Ed). Similarly,
since nine numbers the planets in the actual world but not in every possible world, nine
doesn't have (simpliciter) the property, numbering the planets. Instead it has the property
numbering the planets relative to some worlds, but not relative to others.
If you think that things don't have or lack their properties simpliciter, but only
relative to this or that time, location, person, or world, then you should think that
properties are functions from various kinds of things to extensions. You should think that
numbering the planets is a function from worlds to extensions, being thirsty is a function
from world-time pairs to extensions, being a father (on one reading) is a function from
individuals to extensions, and being surfaced is a function from locations to extensions.
But we shouldn't think any of this, because we should think that things have or
lack their properties simpliciter. A 'property' which is had only relative to this or that
other thing is, whatever formal apparatus we use to describe it, not a property but a
relation. So what the proponent of identifying properties with functions from things of
one sort or another to extensions is proposing is really doing away with genuine
'5 The complication about having the complementary property in some world (rather than just failing to
have the property in some world) is there in order to allow things whose existence is contingent to have
some of their properties essentially.
16 A complication: for modally extended objects, sharing of natural properties will make not for similarity
simpliciter, but for a sort of world-indexed similarity.
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properties and leaving us with only relations in their place. But it's obvious that things
do have properties-it isn't all relations. And so we should have a theory of properties
that allows things to have or lack them simpliciter, rather than merely relative to this or
that other thing.17
At a first pass, this is an appealing argument. But its appeal is based on the
assumption that functions from locations, people, world/time pairs, and worlds to
extensions are all in the same boat, and will sink or swim together as candidates to be the
properties. Since it's clear that functions from locations to extensions, or from people to
extensions, can't be properties, it must be that they all sink. But the various candidates
that Lewis mentions aren't all in the same boat. Not all functions are equally good
candidates to be properties.
Lewis tells us, '[i]n order to say what a meaning is, we may first ask what a
meaning does, and then find out what does that." 8 This isn't a special principle about
meanings. We can use the same procedure for other kinds of things, too. What
properties do (among other things, but first and foremost) is provide semantic values for
predicates. 19 And what the semantic values for predicates do is determine an extension at
each world. (More carefully: they combine with the semantic values of names, quantifier
phrases, etc. to yield propositions. If we take propositions to be functions from worlds to
truth values, then the semantic values of predicates need to determine an extension for
each world)
If that's what properties do, then functions from worlds to extensions do it better
than sets of instances. Such functions can supply the semantic values of predicates that
apply to properties, while sets of instances can supply semantic values only for predicates
that apply exclusively to worldbound individuals.
17 From Lewis (1986a:52-53). All of the examples are his.
i Lewis (1970:193).
- 20 -
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Functions from locations or people to extensions aren't good candidates to be the
properties because they aren't good candidates to be the semantic values of predicates.
They aren't good candidates to be the semantic values of predicates because they don't
do the thing that the semantic value of a predicate needs to do: determine an extension at
each world. Functions from worlds to extensions are, unsurprisingly, ideally suited to the
role of determining an extension at each world. So they're very good candidates to be the
properties. It's not being a function that makes functions from locations, people, etc. to
extensions ineligible to be properties. It's being the wrong kind of function.20
5. Some Consequences
Counterpart Theory
If we accept the revised theory of properties, we lose one of the arguments for
counterpart theory. One reason to be a counterpart theorist is to avoid a problem about
contingent first-order predication. If we take properties to be the sets of their actual and
possible instances, then we have to be counterpart theorists, since otherwise the modally
extended tables, chairs, and philosophers couldn't have any accidental properties. Once
we take properties to be functions from worlds to extensions, we no longer have this
reason to adopt a counterpart theory instead of a theory of transworld individuals.
Of course, there are other reasons to be a counterpart theorist.21 So the revision of
Lewisian metaphysics I've suggested certainly doesn't require us to abandon counterpart
theory. The surviving motivations-the implausibility of ordinary objects being only
19 Lewis (1983b:16-18).
20 What about functions from <world, time> pairs to extensions? How good are they as candidates to be
the properties? We'll come back to this in sections 6 and 7.
21 See Lewis (1971, 1986a) for some of them.
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partly actual (or being points of overlap between worlds), skepticism about whether there
are any deep facts about the essences of things, independent of our concerns or the
particular ways in which we refer to them, a desire to identify statues with the clay that
constitutes them, or persons with their bodies-seem to be the stronger, and the more
philosophically interesting, motivations anyway. But still, it's an interesting fact that one
of counterpart theory's selling points doesn't survive the revision. If the revised
Lewisian is going to be a counterpart theorist, it won't be because they're compelled to
by their theory of properties. Instead it will be due to some slightly more elaborate, and
less obviously conclusive, argument about essentialism, the implausibility of ordinary
objects being that widely scattered, etc.
Events
One place where the revision makes things better for Lewis's metaphysics is in
the theory of events. Lewis (1986b) identifies events with properties of spacetime
regions. It should come as no surprise that this view has trouble accounting for the fact
that events have some of their properties accidentally. The problem is the one you'd
expect. Lewis identifies events with properties of spatiotemporal regions. So, given his
theory of properties, he identifies them with sets of possible regions. But this sort of
modally scattered set isn't the kind of thing that has different counterparts in different
worlds, and so, if the only story about having properties accidentally is the counterpart
account that applies to ordinary worldbound things, events can't have any accidental
properties. But of course they do have accidental properties, so there's some fancy
footwork to be done in order to make the theory plausible.
- 22 -
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Much of 'Events' is spent in an attempt to give an account of what it is for an
event to have a property accidentally-more carefully, of what it is that makes apparent
attributions of accidental properties to events true. As Lewis leaves it at the end of the
paper, the account is remarkably complex and counterintuitive, and, as Lewis notes,
incomplete-there are still accidental properties of events that are left unaccounted for.
This is one of the major blemishes on Lewis's theory of events. It's easy to think that a
theory of events that needs to take such desperate measures in order to account for the
straightforward fact that yesterday's football game involved Brett Favre (featured 700
yards of total offense, came down to the wire, etc.), but might not have, can't possibly be
right.
We can now see that the difficulty about accidental properties that Lewis was
struggling with in 'Events' is an instance of a much more general problem with his theory
of properties. And since we have a solution to the general problem about properties, we
also have a solution to the specific problem about events. None of the elaborate
maneuvers in 'Events' are necessary if properties are functions from worlds to
extensions. So we can keep the core of Lewis's theory of events-that events are
properties of regions of spacetime-without buying ourselves a big problem about how
events can have some of their properties accidentally. 22 This makes Lewis's theory of
events substantially more attractive.
22 Note for aficionados of events: There are actually two problems for Lewis's theory about the properties
of events, and the revised theory of properties that I've suggested only solves one of them. (Though I think
it's the more serious one.) Lewis wants properties of events, in the end, to be explained in terms of the
(more or less intrinsic, more or less natural) properties of the possible regions where the events occur.
There shouldn't be any 'free floating' properties of events. So one problem is: what's the relation between
the properties of events and the properties of the (actual and possible) regions in which they occur? The
revision to the theory of properties is no help at all here. The other problem, though, is: can the Lewisian
allow that, however events come by their properties, they have some of them accidentally? If the answer to
this is 'no', then the theory is dead in the water. If the answer is, 'yes, but only by saying a bunch of really
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Let's take stock of what's happened so far. I've argued that it won't do to
identify properties with the sets of their instances, because if we do, then we can't
account for the fact that properties have some of their properties accidentally. I've also
argued that the way to avoid this problem is to identify properties with functions from
worlds to extensions. Accepting this revision has two interesting consequences: first, we
lose one of the arguments for counterpart theory; and second, we avoid the biggest
problem for Lewis's theory of events. The rest of the paper is about an argument that we
need to make a further revision-that we actually ought to identify properties with
functions from <world, time> pairs to extensions-and the consequences of accepting it.
6. Worlds Enough, or Times?
Functions from people, locations, etc. to extensions are bad candidates to be the
properties. Functions from worlds to extensions are better candidates. What about
functions from <world, time> pairs to extensions? There's an argument for identifying
properties with functions that take <world, time> pairs rather than just worlds as
arguments, parallel to the argument in section 1.
Here is a way that taking properties to be functions from worlds to extensions
could get us in trouble: At a certain time ti, Sylvester is sitting, and therefore has a bent
shape. But Sylvester isn't always sitting. At some other time t2, Sylvester is standing on
a rickety stepladder trying to reach Tweety's cage. So at ti, Sylvester is bent, and at t2
Sylvester is not bent. That is: At tl, Sylvester has the property, being bent, and at tl he
elaborate, counterintuitive stuff', then the theory is at least in serious trouble. And this problem goes away
when we say that properties are functions from worlds to extensions, rather than the sets of their instances.
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lacks the property, being bent. Suppose properties are functions from worlds to
extensions. Then being bent is one such function-call it 'F'. Then, since Sylvester is
bent at tl, he must be a member of F(@). And since Sylvester is not bent at t2, he must
not be a member of F(@). Contradiction.
If this argument sounds familiar, that's because it is. It's essentially Lewis's
argument from temporary intrinsics for the existence of temporal parts. (Rather, it's
essentially the first part of that argument-the rest is ruling out the other candidate
solutions to the problem.) Lewis, of course, avoids this problem by adopting a
metaphysics of temporal parts. 2 3 Then there is no contradiction, because for Sylvester to
be bent at a time t is for Sylvester's temporal part at t to be bent-that is, for Sylvester's
temporal part at t to be a member of F(@)-and there is no problem about some of
Sylvester's temporal parts being members of F(@) while others are not. 24 This would-be
problem about Sylvester's temporary properties, and its solution, are exactly parallel with
the would-be problem about Elmer's accidental properties, and its solution. Different
times play the role of different worlds in the attempt to make trouble, and temporal parts
play the role of otherworldly counterparts in dissolving the problem.
In the earlier argument, we were still able to make trouble by finding a sort of
entity that had accidental properties, but lacked counterparts. Here again, we can revive
23 See Lewis (1986a). See also Quine (1950) and Sider (1997, 2001) for further sympathetic discussion of
temporal parts, and Thomson (1983, 1998), Van Inwagen (1990) and Haslanger (1989a, 1989b, 1994) for
less sympathetic discussion.
24 A complication: Sylvester has lots of different temporal parts that exist at t. (The one that starts at t and
ends three seconds later, the one that starts five minutes before t and ends five minutes after, the one that
starts twelve seconds after Sylvester's birth and ends at his death, etc.) Some of these are also bent at some
times and not at others. So for 'Sylvester's temporal part at t', we should read, 'Sylvester's minimal
temporal part at t'; the relevant temporal parts are probably the instantaneous slices, that exist at exactly
one time. (There's a worry about whether or not these slices are really the right kinds of things to have the
relevant properties, but we won't worry about this for now.)
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the problem by finding a sort of entity that has temporary properties, but lacks temporal
parts. In fact, the same kind of entity will do the trick.
At tl, Sylvester is seated (and therefore bent) and hungry (he's hatching a devious
plan to catch and eat Tweety). At t2, after his plan has come to fruition, Sylvester is
stretching (and therefore straight) and full. Then the property, being bent, is
coinstantiated with being hungry at tl (because Sylvester is bent and hungry), but not at t2.
(Suppose that nobody else is both bent and hungry at t2, either.) That is: being bent has,
at ti, the property, being coinstantiated with being hungry, but lacks it at t2. Suppose that
the property, being coinstantiated with being hungry, is a function from worlds to
extensions-call it 'G'. Since, at tl, being bent is coinstantiated with being hungry, being
bent must be a member of G(@). But since, at t2, it's not coinstantiated with being
hungry (since at t2, nobody is both bent and hungry) it must not be a member of G(@).
Contradiction.
Appealing to temporal parts won't help us in this case, since properties don't have
temporal parts. 25 So we really do have a contradiction.
Just as the problem here mirrors our original problem, the solution here mirrors
our original solution. There is no problem if we take properties to be functions from
<world, time> pairs to extensions.
This allows the extensions assigned to properties to vary with times, not just with
worlds. The property, being coinstantiated with being hungry, can return an extension
that includes being bent taking <@, tl> as argument, but return an extension that doesn't
25 Is this so clear? Well, it's hard to see what the temporal parts of properties would be. The natural
candidates to be the parts of properties, construed as sets of one sort or another (such as sets of instances,
or sets of <world, extension> pairs), are their subsets. But properties won't, in general, have subsets that
are well suited to play the role of temporal parts. (Especially if we've been convinced by the first part of
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include being bent when it takes <@, t2> as argument. Problem solved. Properties are
functions from <world, time> pairs to extensions.
It would be nice if this argument was conclusive. Unfortunately it's not. One of
the unsuccessful objections to the argument in the first section has a parallel here that
isn't subject to the same criticism. Time-relativising the second-order properties, it turns
out, fares better than world-relativising.
One of the responses discussed in section 2 was world-indexing second-order
properties. We deny that there's any such property as being somebody's favorite
property, and replace it with a bunch of world-indexed properties such as being
somebody's favorite property in W453. These properties are had necessarily if at all, so
we're left without any troublesome accidental second-order properties.
This move failed because it assigned the wrong contents to sentences like 'being
green is somebody's favorite property'. The parallel time-indexing move seems to fare
better.
We can avoid the problem about the temporary properties of properties by
denying that there are any. Time-index all of the temporary second-order properties:
there's no such property as being coinstantiated with being hungry-instead there is a
family of time-indexed properties, such as being coinstantiated with being hungry at ti.
In this case, though, there's no problem about assigning the wrong contents to sentences.
The contents assigned to (particular utterances of) sentences like 'being bent is
coinstantiated with being hungry' on this view are perfectly respectable-indeed,
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26intuitively exactly right. 26 So we can resist the argument for taking properties to be
functions from <world, time> pairs to extensions by time-relativising all of the (apparent)
temporary second-order properties. 27
There are some worries about doing away with temporary properties in favor of
their time-relativised cousins. One is that the resulting picture of the world looks
suspiciously like one in which there's not any change-there aren't any properties that
things have at some times, but lack at others. (This is also a worry about the temporal
parts view-really, for any view that doesn't, somehow or other, relativise property
instantiation to times.)2 8
There's also another semantically driven objection to time-relativising properties.
It would be nice if the semantic values of (at least most) predicates were constant across
different contexts. This won't be so if the semantic values of predicates are time-indexed
properties. Predicates like 'is red' will need to express different time-indexed properties
on different occasions of use.
These objections aren't conclusive. I think that the cost/benefit assessment will,
in the end, favor <world, time> functions, but the argument here certainly isn't as open-
and-shut as the case for the first revision. Suppose that you agree with me, and we accept
that properties are functions from <world, time> pairs to extensions. What happens to
the rest of Lewis's system?
26 A first-pass semantics: if Daffy says, 'being bent is coinstantiated with being hungry' at t, then that
occurrence of 'is coinstantiated with being hungry' expresses the time-indexed second-order property,
being coinstantiated with being hungry at t, and so the sentence expresses the proposition that's true in all
and only the possible worlds in which being bent is coinstantiated with being hungry at t-that is, all and
only the worlds in which, at t, something is both bent and hungry. This sounds like an extremely good
candidate to be the content of Daffy's utterance.
27 Of course there are temporal analogues of the modal notions of contingency and necessity, but it's much
less controversial (perhaps not controversial at all) to say that the propositions expressed by the relevant
sentences are all timelessly true than it is to say that they're all necessarily true.
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7. Consequences of the Second Revision
The Puzzle of Change and the Argument from Temporary Intrinsics
Lewis argues that the best way to account for the phenomenon of (intrinsic)
change-the fact that, for example, Sylvester can be bent at t] and not bent at t2-1is to
adopt a metaphysics of temporal parts. Sylvester is bent at tj because his temporal part at
tj is bent, and he's not bent at t2 because his temporal part at t2 is not bent. And while
Sylvester can't both have and not have the same property, there's no problem about some
of his parts having properties that other parts don't. This, together with arguments
against competing solutions, is the argument from temporary intrinsics.
Three things fall out of the discussion in the last section:
First, adopting a metaphysic of temporal parts is not a general solution to the
problem of change. It's a solution that works for particulars, but not for things like
properties, which don't have temporal parts.
Second, if we avoid the problem of change as it arises for second-order properties
by taking properties to be functions from <world, time> pairs to extensions, there's no
need to adopt a metaphysics of temporal parts for particulars. Properties such as being
bent (just like properties such as being coinstantiated with being hungry) can return
different extensions for the same world at different times. So we don't need to appeal to
temporal parts to explain how Sylvester can be bent at some times and not at others, and
the argument from temporary intrinsics loses its force.
Finally, across-the-board time-indexing also defangs the argument from
temporary intrinsics. If we time-index shape properties like being bent, then there's no
28 This sort of worry appears in Haslanger (1989a).
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problem about Sylvester (the cat himself, not just his parts) having some, but not all, of
the various being bent at t properties.
In order for the argument from temporary intrinsics to be persuasive, the Lewisian
needs a non-temporal-parts solution to the problem of temporary second-order properties
that doesn't generalize. If there's no story about temporary second-order properties, then
we haven't solved the problem of change. If the story about second-order properties
generalizes, then we'll already have solved the problem of temporary first-order
properties without any appeal to temporal parts.
I think that the role of intrinsicness in the argument from temporary intrinsics is to
rule out as general solutions certain strategies (like time-relativising) that seem to work
for extrinsic properties. So it must be that, while we can, for example, time-index all of
the extrinsic properties, time-indexing intrinsic properties like being bent is unacceptable.
One reason why we might think this (not Lewis's reason-see below) is that time-
indexed properties are all relational-they're properties that we get from a relation
(between objects and times) by fixing one of the relata (the time). If relational properties
couldn't be intrinsic, then we couldn't say that shape properties were time-indexed, since
shape properties are clearly intrinsic. This would give us a way to accept the time-
indexing solution for temporary second-order properties (which are all extrinsic), but to
deny that it generalizes-we can't apply it across the board, because we'd be left without
any intrinsic properties.
This argument is not persuasive. The claim that no relational property can be
intrinsic has whatever force it has only because it's so clear that relational properties
where the other relatum is something like a person, a location, or a fire hydrant can't be
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intrinsic. It's a hasty overgeneralization from these kinds of examples that leads us to
think that no relational property could be intrinsic. Lewis himself gives a
counterexample: if Platonism is true, then participating in the form of Squareness is,
though relational, still perfectly intrinsic. 29
Lewis's official reason for rejecting time-indexing (and for rejecting views
according to which properties are relations to times) is that it does away with genuine
monadic intrinsic properties like being bent. None of the time-indexed properties can be
identified with being bent, and the bent-at relation that holds between objects and times is
obviously not monadic. So it looks as if being bent has been left out of the picture. And
this is very bad.30
Notice that this objection hinges on monadicity, not on intrinsicness. I don't see
any principled reason for thinking that it's more objectionable to leave the intrinsic being
bent out of the picture than it is to leave out the extrinsic, but equally monadic (and
equally necessary for systematic semantics) being hunted by Elmer, or being somebody's
favorite property. If all monadic properties are on the same footing, then time-indexing
won't work as the conservative Lewisian's non-generalizable solution to the second-order
problem. Either Lewis's objection works, in which case time-indexing isn't a solution to
the second-order problem, or it doesn't, in which case the time-indexing move does
generalize.
Noticing that there's a problem about temporary second-order properties puts the
argument from temporary intrinsics in a bad spot. For the argument to have force, we
must have a principled reason for giving a disunified theory of change, on which we give
- 31 -
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one account of the temporary properties of things with temporal parts and another for the
temporary properties of things (like properties) that lack them. (Or maybe one account
for intrinsic properties and another for extrinsic ones.) There doesn't seem to be any such
reason. So we ought not to be moved by the argument from temporary intrinsics.
This isn't really a consequence of taking properties to be functions from <world,
time> pairs to extensions. It's a consequence of the fact that we need to give an account
of change in things that clearly don't have temporal parts, and there's no good reason to
think that the account we give there won't generalize, and obviate the need to posit
temporal parts in order to solve the problem of change in things like people, tables, and
cats that plausibly do have temporal parts.
Still, the argument from temporary intrinsics isn't the only argument for temporal
parts. 31 Once we've adopted the second revision to the theory of properties, we don't
need to appeal to temporal parts in order to solve the puzzle of change. But it's not as if
the revision forces us to become endurantists. While the new theory of change is clearly
compatible with endurantism, it's compatible with perdurance theories as well. What
happens when we accept the revised theory of properties is that the problem of temporary
intrinsics ceases to be an argument one way or the other.
Proper Subjects of Predication
We have a strong intuition that Sylvester's shape properties are intrinsic. One of
the benefits of a four-dimensionalist ontology of temporal parts was supposed to be that it
3' See for example Lewis (1983c), Cartwright (1975), Balashov (1999), and especially Sider (2001).
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allowed us to respect this intuition in a way that competing theories did not. 32 There is an
equally strong intuition that Sylvester's shape properties are intrinsic properties of
Sylvester. The temporal parts view does not allow us to respect this intuition. It's
Sylvester-stages, not Sylvester, the temporally extended continuant cat, that have the
property being bent. The best that the temporal parts solution can do for Sylvester is to
give him the time-indexed property of being bent at t in virtue of the shape of his t-stage.
Considered as a whole, Sylvester doesn't have any particular shape (except maybe
something describable in 4-d geometrical terms).
This fact has been used to object to temporal parts theories. 33 One benefit of the
proposed revision to the theory of properties is that we can avoid this problem. It's
Sylvester, and not merely his parts, that has shape properties like being bent.
Semantics
Solving the problem of change by attributing temporary properties to temporal
parts makes for an ugly semantics. Subject-predicate sentences will attribute properties
sometimes to continuants, sometimes to their stages. The semantics will be particularly
ugly if we, for example, time-index all of the extrinsic properties (alternatively, all of the
second-order properties) and not the intrinsic (alternatively, the pure first-order)
properties.
One good consequence of the revision is that it allows us to give a substantially
cleaner semantics for predication. Suppose we solve the problem of temporary (first-
order) properties by saying that properties like being bent are really properties of person-
32 It's not clear that this is really so-it's not clear why competing theories like time-indexing, or taking
properties to be <world, time> functions, have any problem about intrinsicness. But leave this aside.
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stages and cat-stages, rather than properties of temporally extended persons and cats. We
still need to give an account of the cases where the properties being attributed are clearly
properties of persons, not properties of stages. Doing this will require us to give a more
complicated and disunified semantics than we'd like.
Here's one way it could go: Names like Sylvester' (and probably noun phrases in
general) are ambiguous between continuant objects and their stages. When I say,
'Sylvester is bent', 'Sylvester' refers not to the whole cat, Sylvester, but to a Sylvester-
stage. When I say, 'Sylvester is a cat', 'Sylvester' refers to Sylvester, the temporally
extended continuant cat. When I say, 'Sylvester is a bent cat', 'Sylvester is a cat who is
bent', or 'Sylvester is both bent and a cat', something fancy is going on. (For example,
maybe the predicates are also ambiguous.)
Whatever the story is, it's going to be messier than we'd like. 34 It would be nice
if people's (and cats') names reliably referred to the relevant people and cats. It would be
nice to keep the systematic ambiguity of predicates to a minimum. And it would be nice
if the attribution of temporary properties worked the same way across the board-not by
sometimes attributing time-indexed properties to whole objects, and sometimes
attributing unindexed properties to stages. If we take properties to be functions from
<world, time> pairs to extensions, we don't need to make either noun phrases or
predicates ambiguous in order to deal with the problem of change, and we can have a
uniform story-we never need to do any time-indexing, and we can always attribute the
properties to the whole object.
33 See Haslanger (1989a, 1989b).
34 How problematic this is, and how unique this problem is to temporal parts, is an interesting question.
Chomsky (2000) discusses some similar examples that are independent of what we think about four-
dimensionalism. We say things like, 'the tattered book on the table has been on the best-sellers list for
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One seemingly less attractive consequence is that properties cease to be the kind
of thing that, given an object, determines a possible-worlds proposition. On this account,
properties will combine with objects to determine functions from <world, time> pairs to
truth-values, not functions from worlds to truth values. So when we get the semantic
values of subject-predicate sentences by composing the semantic values of the subject
expression and the predicate expression, we won't get possible-worlds propositions.
We'll get tensed propositions-functions from <world, time> pairs to extensions-things
whose truth values can vary at different times within the same world.
It's not clear what we should think of this consequence. If we were convinced
that the semantic values of sentences had to be possible-worlds propositions, then it
would be unwelcome. But it shouldn't be that unwelcome, for two reasons. First, it's not
so clear that the semantic values of sentences have to be possible-worlds propositions
rather than tensed propositions. Second, even if the contents of most sentences turn out
to vary across times, we'll still have some eternal sentences whose truth-values aren't
affected by the time. 35
Attitudes De Se 36
Lewis (1979) argues that attitudes like belief and desire are best thought of, not as
attitudes toward propositions, but toward properties. The reason for this is that
twelve weeks now'. This requires some sort of special treatment, since only book-tokens are tattered, and
only book-types make the best-seller list. (Though Chomsky puts these examples to a different use.)
35 It's also not so clear that this view of the semantic values of predicates really commits us to any
particular view about the semantic values of sentences. If we still want sentences to be associated with
possible-worlds propositions, we can adjust the rest of our semantic (and maybe syntactic) theory in order
to get some other constituent of the sentence to do the extra work.
36 Thanks to Bob Stalnaker for pointing out this consequence.
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propositions-thought of as functions from worlds to truth values-won't do as the
contents of self-locating beliefs.37
Suppose Pepe is lost in the library. This might be because he does't know which
world is actual-because, for example, he doesn't know what the actual floorplan of the
library is. But Pepe could still be lost, even if he knew everything there is to know about
which world is actual. He could know the complete floorplan of the library, and even the
location of every person, cat, and skunk in the library, and still not know where he is,
because he could still fail to know which, of all of the creatures in the library, is him. (It
helps, to make this sort of ignorance compatible with full knowledge of which world is
actual, to suppose that it's a very boring library full of amnesiacs, all having experiences
indiscernible from Pepe' s.)38
The same concerns arise for beliefs that, for example, my pants are on fire. I can
believe that my pants are on fire without believing that Egan's pants are on fire, and I can
hope that someone turns a fire extinguisher on me right now without hoping that someone
turns a fire extinguisher on Egan at 5:41pm. There also seems to be something that we
both believe when I believe that my pants are on fire, and you believe that your pants are
on fire. These facts are not easily accommodated on a view that takes attitudes like belief
and desire to be attitudes toward possible-worlds propositions. Knowing which possible-
worlds propositions are true can, at best, pick out a unique world as the one we inhabit.
And like they say in the James Bond movie, sometimes (as when we want to know who
or where we are) the world is not enough. We also need to know our place within it.
37 See also Perry (1979) for similar arguments (with a somewhat different conclusion), and Elga (2000,
forthcoming), Perry (2001), and Stalnaker (1981, forthcoming) for more discussion and some interesting
a pplications.
Well, a library that's boring apart from the fact that it's full of amnesiac skunks.
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We can treat self-locating attitudes as attitudes toward properties, rather than
toward propositions. So (on Lewis's theory of properties) when I believe that my pants
are on fire, I believe that I am one of the possible individuals with burning pants. My
attitude is toward a property-having burning pants, and the content of the belief is that I
am one of the individuals who instantiates the property. 39 We get essentially the same
results if we accept the first revision and take properties to be functions from worlds to
individuals. 40
There's something very appealing about the treatment of self-locating beliefs as
self-ascription of properties. But this strategy runs into trouble with temporally self-
locating beliefs.
Lewis can't say that, when we have beliefs about what time it is, we're self-
ascribing some property. All but the most unfortunate people are temporally extended.
So our attitudes toward properties (considered as sets of individuals) will single out sets
of temporally extended things-four-dimensional spacetime worms. But singling out a
worm doesn't tell us what time it is. So (though they don't say this in the Bond movie)
sometimes-when, for example, we want to know what time it is-the worm is not
enough.
39 As opposed to my attitude being toward a proposition-that Egan has burning pants, and the content of
the belief being that I am in one of the worlds in which the proposition is true.
40 t's a bit trickier to state just what's going on, though. The best way to see it is this: Functions f from
worlds to extensions are in one-one correspondence with sets of <w, i> pairs (where w is a world and i an
individual) such that i is a member off(w). So when we take self-locating beliefs, desires, etc. to be
attitudes toward properties, we can think of them as attitudes toward, not sets of worlds, but sets of <world,
individual> pairs. If individuals are worldbound, then the worlds won't be doing any work-sets of
individuals would do just as well. But this way of treating the contents of self-locating beliefs is
compatible with (though it doesn't mandate) taking individuals to be present in more than one world.
Notice that this mirrors proposals that treat the contents of self-locating beliefs as sets of centered worlds.
(See e.g. Chalmers (1996, 2002).) Some people also include a specification of a time in their centered
worlds-we'll get to this in a moment.
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If we say that properties are either the sets of their instances or functions from
worlds to extensions, we can't treat my beliefs about what time it is as self-ascriptions of
properties. No property of Egan-the continuant person-is going to make the relevant
distinctions between different times. The most natural thing to say, probably, is that it's
not people that have temporally self-locating beliefs, but their temporal parts. It's not me,
but my present temporal part, that thinks that it's 5:30 (by thinking that it's one of the
5:30 person-stages). But this sounds strange. It's certainly surprising to learn that people
never have beliefs about the time.4 1
It would be nice not to have to say this, and we don't have to if we accept the
second revision. If properties are functions from <world, time> pairs to extensions, then
people really can have temporally self-locating beliefs by self-ascribing properties. 4 2 So
we get a nicer story about temporally self-locating beliefs if we accept the second
revision: beliefs about what time it is can be treated as self-attributions of properties by
people, not just by their stages.
41 In fact, people probably don't have many beliefs at all, if we adopt a temporal parts based solution to the
problem of change. Properties like believing that P will almost always be temporary, and so they won't be
properties of continuant people, but of their stages. There is, of course, footwork to be done here-there
are ways of making it out that, even though people never instantiate belief-properties, people still have
beliefs by having parts that instantiate belief-properties. We can do this, but it would be nice if we didn't
have to.
42 Again, it's a bit tricky to say carefully what's going on. Just as we can treat functions from worlds to
extensions as sets of ordered pairs of worlds and individuals, we can treat a function f from <world, time>
pairs to extensions as the set of <w,t,i> triples (where w is a world, t is a time, and i is an object) such that i
is a member offl(<w,t>). Then we can think of your self-locating beliefs (including your temporally self-
locating beliefs) as attitudes toward sets of such triples, such that the belief is accurate iff <@, now, you> is
in the set. This mirrors accounts of centered-worlds contents in which centered worlds include a
specification of the time. (Thanks to Juan Comesana for discussion here.)
-38-
_·_ _I~·_ _ ___· _____ I _·· P 1_1 I _II__L_ I __ _·_ __ _C _ ___~_·~·~_··
..~-.I·-. - --.· · --- ~--' I·-~A-L-
Second-Order Predication
Conclusion
Problems about accidental second-order predication motivate us-force us, I
think-not to identify properties with the sets of their instances. If we identify them
instead with functions from worlds to extensions, we get a theory of properties that is
neutral with respect to disputes over counterpart theory, and we avoid a problem for
Lewis's theory of events.
Similar problems about temporary second-order predication motivate us-though
this time I don't think that they force us-to give up this theory as well, and to identify
properties with functions from <world, time> pairs to extensions. Again, the replacement
theory is neutral with respect to a metaphysical dispute that the old theory (seems to)
force us to take a stand on-the dispute over whether objects have temporal parts. It also
allows us to give a smoother semantics for predication, and to better accommodate our
intuitions about which objects temporary properties are properties of, and to make
temporally self-locating beliefs genuinely self-locating.
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Secondary Qualities, Self-Locating Belief, and Self-Locating Assertion
Introduction
It's common for philosophers to want to draw a distinction between those
qualities that are fully objective, genuine qualities of things as they are in themselves, and
those that are somehow subjective, less than fully real, qualities of things as they are for
us. This distinction is elusive; while it's quite compelling intuitively, it's also extremely
difficult to characterize. My goal in this paper will be to offer such a characterization.
The distinction we'd like to draw is one that's at least in the neighborhood of the
traditional distinction between primary and secondary qualities-primary qualities are
typically taken to be of the former kind, secondary qualities of the latter.
1. The Job Description
I'm going to call the elusive distinction between the fully real, perfectly objective
qualities of things and the less-than-fully-real, subjective qualities the primary/secondary
quality distinction.
I definitely don't want to claim that the distinction I'm going to draw captures
everything everybody's ever wanted to say about any distinction that has ever gone by
that name. I doubt that any distinction could do that-people have said an awful lot
about the distinction (or more likely, some distinctions) between primary and secondary
qualities, and it's probably not all consistent. All that I'm hoping to do here is provide a
distinction that captures a cluster of ideas (about objectivity, less-than-full reality, etc.)
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that seem to be (a) central to at least some understandings of the traditional distinction,
and (b) hard to cash out in a satisfying way.
There's a lot of rhertoric that surrounds (at least very many versions of) the
traditional distinction between primary and secondary qualities. The ways in which the
distinction has been drawn don't seem to justify the rhetoric. What I want to do here is
provide a distinction (the only one, I think) that justifies the rhetoric.
I take the task of justifying the rhetoric to be more important than making sure
that the distinction classifies particular qualities as primary and secondary along the lines
that philosophers have traditionally wanted to divide them. In particular, I take it to be of
only secondary importance that the traditional paradigm cases of secondary qualities-
sensory qualities like colors, tastes, smells, etc.-turn out to be secondary qualities, when
the distinction between primary and secondary qualities is cashed out in the way that I
suggest. I think that, in fact, my distinction does carve quite close to the traditional one,
but what I'm primarily concerned to do is to provide a distinction that justifies, for
whichever qualities turn out to be properly classified as secondary, the rhetoric that's
been employed in discussing the qualities that have traditionally been classified as
secondary. I don't care so much about justifying the traditional classifications.
Following are some examples of the sorts of rhetoric that I'm concerned to justify.
Some of the passages are about secondary qualities in general, or the distinction between
primary and secondary qualities, while others make claims about particular qualities
which are taken to be secondary. Notice that claims of the second kind can be separated
into two parts: first, the claim that secondary qualities are thus-and-so, and second, the
claim that some quality Q is a secondary quality. What I want to focus on from these
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passages is just the first part-the characterization of what's supposed to be distinctive of
the secondary qualities, and how they're supposed to be different from the primary
qualities, rather than the claims about which qualities are primary and which are
secondary.
St. Paul:
There is nothing unclean of itself: but to him that esteementh any thing to be unclean, to him it is
unclean...2
Galileo:
Hence I think that these tastes, odors, colors, etc....hold their residence solely in the sensitive body;
so that if the animal were removed, every such quality would be abolished and annihilated. 3
Bernard Williams:
In understanding, even sketchily, at a general and reflective level, why things appear variously
coloured to various observers, we shall find that we have left behind any idea that, in some way
which transcends those facts, they 'really' have one colour rather than another. In thinking of
these explanations, we are in fact using a conception in which colour does not figure at all as a
quality of the things.4
We can say, and indeed say truly, that grass before there was consciousness was green... But it is,
nonetheless, relative, relating to human tastes and interests.5
Il suspect that, for example, colors probably aren't secondary qualities, but the claims that are made about
the colors below are still useful for characterizing the primary/secondary quality distinction.
2 Romans 14:14 (thanks to Tyler Doggett for the reference.)
3 Galileo (1842: 333).
4 Williams (1978: 242).
5 Ibid: 243. Williams is actually talking about amusingness, not green, in the second part of the quote, but
nothing hangs on this.
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Thomas Nagel:
The third step is to try to form a conception of that true nature [of the physical world] independent
of its appearance either to us or to other types of observers. This means not only not thinking of
the physical world from our own particular point of view, but not thinking of it from a more
general human perceptual point of view either: not thinking of how it looks, feels, smells, tastes,
or sounds. These secondary qualities then drop out of our picture of the external world...
Colin McGinn:
Secondary qualities resemble properties like being poisonous or nourishing in this respect: plainly,
these properties are relative to some implicit or explicit choice of creature as that with respect to
which a substance is declared poisonous or nourishing. This relativity implies that there is no
genuine disagreement between us and the Martians when they call an object green which we call
red...7
I think it is an a priori truth that only the primary qualities correspond to how things are in
themselves...
What the scientifically informed view denies is [not that objects are coloured, but] just that objects
are objectively or intrinsically coloured, i.e. that objects have colour in the way that they have
shape; it denies that possession of colour is an observer-independent condition.
9
There are some themes that emerge from the series of quotations above.
Secondary qualities are supposed to be observer-dependent:the secondary qualities
depend (in some non-trivial way) on the existence or the peculiarities of observers in a
way that primary qualities don't. They're supposed to exhibit some sort of relativity:
6 Nagel (1989: 14). My italics.
7 McGinn (1983: 10).
8 Ibid pl14.
9 ibid p1 18. His italics.
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secondary qualities are unlike primary qualities in that an object can have a secondary
quality relative to one observer that it lacks relative to another.10 Finally, they're
supposed to be somehow metaphysically second-class. They display a sort of unreality-
there's something less than fully real about the secondary qualities. It's hard to say just
what that's supposed to amount to before giving more of a story about the distinction.
The primary/secondary quality distinction that I'm after is whichever one justifies
(or does the best job of justifying) the sorts of rhetoric displayed above. Again, this may
or may not map nicely onto any of the many distinctions of the same name that are to be
found in the philosophical literature. I'm not terribly concerned about whether it does or
not. What I care about is that it capture the thought which I think underlies (at least a
great deal of) the interest in drawing any of the primary/secondary distinctions that have
in fact been drawn: that there is an important difference between the fully real, observer-
independent qualities of things, and the metaphysically second-class, observer-dependent
qualities of things.
2. Trouble
One distinction that would at least get us the more real/less real part of the
primary/secondary rhetoric is the distinction between properties that things actually have
and properties that they don't. But this obviously would be an extremely unsatisfying
way to draw the distinction. For one thing, it would probably involve us in attributing an
awful lot of systematic error. For another, it doesn't really justify the rhetoric. Any
distinction between primary and secondary qualities that justifies the traditional rheroric
will have to run a lot deeper. To justify, for example, the talk about relativity and
10 McGinn is particularly explicit about this.
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observer-dependence, it will have to turn out that, among the qualities that we correctly
attribute to things, some of them are more real, more objective, more a part of the
absolute conception of the world, than others.'1
But it might be that some sort of projectivist error theory is the best that we can
do. Gideon Rosen (1994) discusses the urge to draw a metaphysically substantive
distinction between two kinds of facts, such that facts of one kind characterize the world
as it is in itself, are objective, fully real, etc., while facts of the other kind characterize the
world as it is for us, are subjective, less than fully real, etc. He makes a persuasive case
that this can't be done.12
If Rosen is right that there's no interesting metaphysical distinction in point of
objectivity and subjectivity between facts, then it's hard to see how there could be one at
the level of qualities. If we had qualities that were, in some metaphysically interesting
sense, subjective, less than fully real, etc., then we could get metaphysically second-class
facts by correctly attributing those qualities to things. So if there aren't any interestingly
subjective facts, there must not be any interestingly subjective qualities, either.
Rosen argues pretty convincingly that the usual ways in which people have tried
to draw the distinction won't work. I'll briefly discuss just two examples here:
That some fact, quality, or entity is mind-dependent doesn't seem to impugn its
full, first-class reality. Certainly a fact's being causally mind-dependent-in that its
"1 Not everyone says this. One could be a projectivist, and think that the secondary qualities are qualities of
our experiences that we mistakenly attribute to things outside the mind. Then the more real/less real
distinction would be the distinction between properties that are correctly/mistakenly attributed to the things
we attribute them to. (See for example Boghossian and Velleman (1989).) This requires accepting an error
theory, though, instead of just a theory about the nature of the qualities that we correctly attribute to things.
And a lot of the primary/secondary rhetoric seems to suggest a difference in the kind of quality being
correctly attributed (to things outside the mind), rather than a difference in the accuracy of the attribution.
12 Alex Byrne (2001, 2002) makes some very similar points (influenced by Rosen), in response to Stroud
(2000).
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obtaining was brought about by some mental activity-doesn't make the fact
metaphysically second-class. Facts about the existence of artifacts, for example, are as
metaphysically respectable as facts get, and they're causally mind-dependent-the
existence of my kitchen table was brought about, at least in part, by the thoughts, plans,
and intentions of some carpenter.
Response-dependence also seems not to do the trick. That a thing is disposed to
cause response R in a subject S in circumstances C is a perfectly objective fact about the
thing. Consider Locke's tertiary qualities, of being, for example, disposed to melt wax in
ordinary circumstances, or Rosen's example of being disposed to annoy fox terriers under
ordinary circumstances. These are perfectly objective features of whatever has them.
The fact that something is disposed to melt wax, or to annoy fox terriers, isn't in any way
metaphysically second-class, subjective, or less than fully real. And if these aren't
metaphysically second-class, then neither is, for example, being disposed to cause
sensations of kind K in humans.
Our almost obsessive interest in these latter kinds of facts-facts about which
things are disposed to cause which responses in humans-is subjective, parochial, and so
forth, but the facts themselves are perfectly objective. Facts about what's disposed to
cause certain kinds of sensations in us are just as much a part of the world as it is in itself
as the facts about which things are disposed to melt wax or annoy fox terriers. So
response-dependence doesn't seem to get us any metaphysically interesting distinction
between the objective, genuine facts and those that are subjective and therefore somehow
second-class.
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The moral of Rosen's story seems to be: if an object has a property, then it's a
perfectly objective matter of fact that it has that property. We can find properties such
that our reasons for being interested in which things have them are subjective and
parochial, but that doesn't make them metaphysically second-class-it doesn't make the
fact or the property subjective in any metaphysically interesting sense.13
Still, I think there are some features that we attribute to things that are subjective
in a way that makes them metaphysically second-class.
3. Centering Features
There's an attractive picture of mental and linguistic content on which the role of
mental states and linguistic representations is to distinguish between possibilities. My
beliefs distinguish between the possibilities that I take to be candidates for actuality and
the ones that I rule out, my desires distinguish between the possibilities that I hope for
and those that I dread, and my assertions distinguish between (roughly) those possibilities
that I'm asking you to rule out and those that you're free to leave open.14
If we like this possibility-sorting picture of content, then it's very natural to
represent contents as sets of possible worlds. The content of a belief, desire, or assertion
is the set of worlds where things are as they're believed, desired, or asserted to be.
Typically (always?) the relevant sets of worlds are picked out by attributing
properties to things-I believe that Fido is furry, desire that my dissertation is complete,
13 Robert Stalnaker has suggested the distinction between natural and unnatural properties as another place
to locate the primary/secondary quality distinction. This is a metaphysically interesting distinction between
kinds of properties that we correctly attribute to things. But it's probably not metaphysically interesting in
the right way-it doesn't license the sorts of relativity and observer-dependence rhetoric that surrounds the
secondary qualities.
14 See (among others) Stalnaker (1984).
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and assert that France is hexagonal. The content of my belief, desire, or assertion is the
set of worlds in which the relevant things have the relevant properties.
There's a distinctive role that the property plays in determining the possible-
worlds content of my belief, desire, or assertion: given an object, the property determines
a set of worlds-the worlds in which the object has the property. So given Fido, the
property, being furry determines a set of worlds: the worlds in which Fido is furry.
Equivalently, given a world w, the property determines an extension-the set of
things that have the property in w. Given a world w, being furry determines an
extension-all of the things that are furry in w. Fido is in the extension of being furry in
w iff w is a member of the proposition expressed by "Fido is furry".
So we can think of properties as functions from worlds to extensions (or,
equivalently, as functions from objects to possible-worlds propositions). 15 This illustrates
the distinctive role that properties play in characterizing, and maybe in determining, the
contents of representations-we can characterize the possible-worlds content of a
representation by saying which properties it attributes to which things. Maybe it's also
true that the way the content gets determined is by bits of the thing doing the representing
that are associated with the properties getting put together in the right way with bits that
are associated with the objects. (That is how it works with natural language-at least, for
the simple, subject/predicate bits of it.16 Fodor & co. think that's how it works with
15 Note that we need to have merely possible objects available to be elements of the extensions in the first
case, and values of the functions in the second, for this to work. Also, this isn't quite my official story-I
think that properties are functions from <world, time> pairs to extensions, but nothing hangs on the
difference here. (See "Second Order Predication and the Metaphysics of Properties".)
16 Things are a bit more complicated for, e.g., universal and existential claims, where the properties aren't
being attributed to any particular object, but not, I think, in a way that makes any trouble.
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mental representation, too, but that's more controversial. So I'm going to be adamant
about the description/characterization claim, tentative about the determination claim.)
Take "Kermit is a frog". This sentence picks out a set of worlds-the one in
which Kermit's got the property, being a frog. A belief or assertion whose content is that
set of worlds is one that represents Kermit as having a certain feature-namely, being a
frog.17 Not-so-bold claim: this is a really central, indispensable way of characterizing the
possible-worlds contents of mental states, assertions, etc.
There's good reason to think that some contentful mental states-beliefs and
desires, for example-don't have (merely) possible-worlds content, but have centered-
worlds content instead (or as well). (This is motivated by arguments and examples from
Perry (1979) and Lewis (1979).)
A possible world is a way things might have been. For present purposes, we can
either follow Lewis and take possible worlds to be big concrete universes-more things
of the same kind as us and all of our surroundings-or we can follow Stalnaker, and take
them to be maximally specific properties that the whole universe might have
instantiated.' 8 A centered world is to a possible world what a map with a "you are here"
arrow added is to an arrowless map. Centered worlds single out not just a way for the
world to be, but also a location within the world. They're probably best thought of as
ordered pairs of a world and a center. There are different ways of picking out a center-
the center could be, for example, a spacetime point or an individual within the world.
17 1 should point out that I'm working with a pretty undemanding notion of what it takes to correctly
attribute a property to something. I attribute a property F to an object a iff I believe some proposition p
such that (i) p is the proposition that you get by applying F to a, and (ii) p is true. (In order to just attribute
F to a, all I have to do is satisfy (i).) This is a pretty minimal standard for correct attribution-it doesn't
make any claims about the structure of the relevant mental representation, for example.
18 See Lewis (1973, 1986), and Stalnaker (1984, 1996).
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Not much hangs on this decision, but it will be convenient for present purposes to take
centers to be <individual, time> pairs. 19
If we think of representation in terms of selection among possibilities, then we
can think of representations with possible-worlds contents as selecting among
possibilities for the world, and those with centered-worlds as selecting among
possibilities for the agent. My beliefs, desires, etc. with possible-worlds content draw
distinctions between ways the world might be, while my beliefs, desires, etc. with
centered-worlds content draw distinctions between situations that I might be in. The
latter are more fine-grained than the former, since (at least in most cases), each world is
going to contain a number of positions that some agent might occupy.
We ought to say that some mental representations have centered-worlds content.
When I have beliefs about my location, or the time, my belief is not well represented as
an attitude toward a possible-worlds proposition. Possible-worlds propositions don't cut
finely enough-knowledge of, and belief about, possible-worlds propositions can pin
down which world I'm in, but they can't pin down my location (either spatial or temporal)
within that world.20,
21
(A brief digression: Perry draws an importantly different conclusion from the
cases. He wants to locate the extra structure not in the contents of belief, but in the
belief-states. So, when each of us believes that our own pants are on fire, there's no
19 This is in order to remain as neutral as possible about issues having to do with persistence and the nature
of properties, while keeping the individuals-as-centers picture which makes thinking about centered worlds
more natural and intuitive than the spacetime-points-as-centers picture.
20 See Lewis (1979) and Perry (1979) for the classic examples. Stalnaker (1981) also discusses a number of
nice examples, though he offers an alternative account of the phenomenon there.
21 A complication: anything that determines a possible-worlds proposition determines a centered-worlds
proposition. It just determines (to introduce a technical term) a boring centered-worlds proposition, that
includes, for each world w, either all of the positions in w or none of them. So the claim is really that many
contentful mental states have contents that determine interesting (i.e., non-boring) centered worlds
propositions.
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common content to our beliefs, but we're in the same kind of belief-state. If this kind of
account is right, then we don't need centered-worlds contents for propositional attitudes.
I'm going to assume without argument that this kind of account isn't right, and that
propositional attitudes do, at least sometimes, have centered-worlds contents. (And that
since centered-worlds contents are the contents of propositional attitudes, that it's safe to
call them propositions.) It's worth noticing that if I'm wrong about the need for centered-
worlds content, pretty much everything I say from now on will be false.)
We describe the possible-worlds content of a representation (largely) in terms of
the properties that things are represented as having. By representing Kermit as having
the property, being green, we pick out a class of worlds-all and only the worlds in which
Kermit is green. When I believe that the world is a certain way, I represent some things
as being green and others as being red, some things as being furry and others as being
scaly, and so on. In this way I narrow down the range of worlds that I take to be
candidates for actuality. (We can tell the same kind of story of other kinds of
representational states and entities-for example desires, fears, and natural language
sentences.)
When I have beliefs not just about what the world is like, but about my location
within it-when I have self-locating beliefs-something very similar is going on. I
represent some things as being nearby and others as far away, some events as present and
others as past or future, and some objects as being on my foot and others as in my ear. In
this way I narrow down the range of possible predicaments-possible locations within
worlds-that I take to be candidates to be the one that I am in. (Again, the same goes for
other representations with this kind of content.)
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The ways in which we describe centered-worlds contents are very similar to the
ways in which we describe possible-worlds contents. In the possible-worlds case, one
very common way to single out a set of worlds is by attributing some property like being
green to some object like Kermit. In the centered-worlds case, a very common way to
single out a set of centered worlds is by attributing some "property" like being nearby to
some object like Kermit. Just as being green is a function that, when we plug Kermit into
it, delivers a set of worlds (the ones in which Kermit's green), being nearby is a function
that, when we plug Kermit into it, delivers a set of centered worlds-the ones where
Kermit's near the center. At least, this looks like a tempting thing to say. But maybe we
shouldn't be so quick to say that there are any such "properties" as being nearby or being
on my foot for us to attribute to things.
It's certainly true that if there are such "properties", they deserve the scare
quotes-they're not properties. Properties are (or at least determine) functions from
worlds to extensions. A "property" like being nearby won't do that. Which things are
nearby-which things are in the extension of the "property", being nearby-depends not
just on which world is actual, but also on where you are within the world. 22 You and I
are worldmates, but lots of things are near me and far away from you. So being nearby
doesn't determine a function from worlds to extensions, and so it's not a property. 23
22 It also depends on the currently active standards of nearness, but let's ignore that for now and pretend
that there's only one standard of nearness that applies in all contexts.
23 Again, my official view is that properties are functions from <world, time> pairs to extensions, but that
doesn't matter for present purposes; being nearby doesn't determine one of those, either. Why am I so sure
that they're not properties? Well, this is partly stipulative. Nothing bad happens if I allow that they're
properties, but insist that there's an important distinction between two kinds of properties. One reason for
insisting on the name, though, is that properties ought to be the sort of thing about which a
nominalist/universalist/trope theorist debate wouldn't just be crazy. There's no plausibility at all to the idea
that centering features are some screwy kind of universal, or sets of screwy kinds of tropes.
- 53 -
Secondary Qualities
This shouldn't be surprising. If it was a property, it wouldn't be fit to play the
role that it does in determining centered-world contents, because we wouldn't be able to
use it to distinguish between different positions within a given world. What it is is the
analogue of a property for centered-worlds contents. That is, it's a function (or
something that determines a function) from centered worlds to extensions, in the same
way that a property is (or determines) a function from worlds to extensions. So given a
world and a center, is nearby will give us the set of things that are nearby if we're at that
location in that world. And given an object, being nearby will give us the set of centered
worlds in which that object is nearby (that is, near the center). We can pick out a set of
centered worlds by saying that they're the ones in which Kermit is nearby-the ones that,
when plugged into the being nearby function, deliver an extension that includes Kermit.
We need a name for these things. I'll call them centering features. 'Features' to
indicate that they're property-analogues, not properties, and 'centering' because their
descriptive role is to select not just a world, but a center (attributing a property to Kermit
selects between worlds that might be the one that I inhabit, while attributing a centering
feature to Kermit selects between predicaments that might be the one that I am in). 24,25
But whatever we call them, two things should be pretty clear: First, they're useful
for describing centered-worlds contents. In the same way that it's useful to talk about the
24 Thanks to Alex Byrne for the name. It's important to notice the difference between centering features
and predicates with hidden indexicals. When I attribute a property to something using a predicate with a
hidden indexical, I'm still attributing a property, and so I'm still expressing a possible-worlds proposition.
It's just that which property I attribute to things with a use of the predicate varies from context to context.
If we had a predicate that expressed a centering feature, sentences in which it occurred (in the usual way)
would express centered-worlds propositions. One difficulty with the primary/secondary quality distinction
I'm trying to draw here is that it's not obvious that there are any predicates that express centering
features-more on this in section 5.
25 In the same way that there are interesting and boring centered-worlds propositions (in the sense defined
in note 20), there are interesting and boring centering features-the boring ones are the ones that, when
combined with objects, always determine boring centered-worlds propositions, and the interesting ones are
the ones that sometimes determine interesting centered-worlds propositions.
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properties that people attribute to things in describing their beliefs about which world is
actual (try specifying the content of my belief that Kermit is green without appealing to
properties), it's useful to talk about the centering features that people attribute to things in
describing their self-locating beliefs (beliefs about which predicament they're in).
Second, there's nothing mysterious about them. Properties are one kind of set theoretical
object-functions from worlds to extensions-and centering features are set-theoretical
objects of another, analogous kind-functions from centered worlds to extensions. 2 6
Some terminology:
A quality or feature is something that determines a function from objects to
contents, where the contents might be either sets of possible worlds or sets of centered
worlds.
A property is a kind of quality-the kind that determines a possible-worlds
content.
A centering feature is a quality that determines a centered-worlds content.
A representation attributes a feature to an object iff the representation has as its
content the proposition that's determined by applying the quality to the object. 27 (So
26 Or at least they stand in some very intimate relation to such set-theoretic objects. The identity claims are
more controversial. But even if the identity claims are false, centering features don't seem to be any more
mysterious than properties. (Two further, somewhat sketchy points: The set-theoretic identity claims seem,
if anything, more plausible for centering features than for properties, since centering features don't have, as
part of their job description, the objective-similarity-grounding and relevance-to-causal-powers roles that
properties are often taken to have in theirs. Second, if there's a split in the property role, between, say, the
properties that play a role in describing and determining content and the ones that explain the similarities
between and causal powers of objects, then the set-theoretic identity claims look more plausible for the
content describing and determining properties, and centering features will be of the same kind as these sorts
of properties.)
27 Better, if its content is something that entails the proposition that you get by applying the quality to the
object. (This is to get it to turn out that 'Kermit is green and Big Bird is yellow' attributes being green to
Kermit.)
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representations that attribute properties to things have possible-worlds content, and
representations that attribute centering features to things have centered-worlds content.) 2 8
4. Secondary Qualities as Centering Features
Centering features are well suited to play the role of secondary qualities, and the
property/centering feature distinction is well suited play the role of the primary/secondary
quality distinction. That is, it's well suited to justify the kinds of relativity, observer-
dependence, and less-than-full-reality rhetoric that's distinctive of talk about secondary
qualities. 29
I said earlier that centered worlds are to possible worlds what maps with "you are
here" arrows are to maps without such arrows. A helpful extension of that metaphor is to
think of possible-worlds contents as distinguishing between classes of maps, and
centered-worlds contents as distinguishing between classes of maps-with-arrows. This
picture of the difference between centered-world and possible-world contents makes it
easier to see how the distinction between properties and centering features parallels the
28 Note that these needn't be exclusive-there might be representations with both kinds of content.
29 Let's distinguish two questions: (i) Can we make sense of there being any features of things represented
in experience that behave in the way secondary qualities are supposed to? (ii) Is it plausible that the
particular features that people have taken to be secondary qualities (e.g. colors) behave that way?
The claim I'm mostly going to be concerned with is that the answer to the first question is "yes,
and they're centering features". I'm not so sure about the second, though I'll have a bit to say about it
toward the end of the paper. The main thing that I want to do is open up a space for a primary/secondary
quality distinction, or something very like it-to show that there can be a metaphysically significant
distinction in point of objectivity, genuine reality, etc. between two classes of qualities, both of which we
correctly attribute to things outside the mind. I'm less worried (at least for now) about saying which side of
the line particular qualities like colors, smells, etc. fall on.
The second question is interesting, but it's only interesting once we've got a serviceable answer to
the first question-a serviceable characterization of what the distinction is. Questions about which sides of
some line different qualities fall on are only interesting (or answerable) once we have some idea of where
the line is. So before we can sort out whether or not, for example, colors are secondary qualities, we need
to know just what (or at least roughly what) being a secondary quality amounts to.
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distinction between primary and secondary qualities. (How to restate the same points
without the metaphor should be clear enough.)
Remember the themes we drew from the series of quotations in section 1.
Secondary qualities are supposed to be observer-dependent, relative, and less-than-fully
real in a way that distinguishes them from the primary qualities.
One way that the less-than-full-reality talk is sometimes put is that the secondary
qualities go missing from the "absolute conception" of the world. They're features of
things "as they are for us" rather than "as they are in themselves".
When we characterize the distinction between primary and secondary qualities as
the distinction between properties and centering features, we can get a plausible
understanding of what "absolute conception" means, such that secondary don't appear in
the absolute conception of the world. The absolute conception of the world is supposed
to be the one that everybody has got to accept, regardless of what their perceptual
apparatus, etc. is like. That looks like the conception that picks out which world is actual,
and no more. Any conception of the world that has a content that's more fine-grained
than a possible-worlds proposition is going to be non-mandatory-it needn't be shared by
all of the maximally well-informed inhabitants of a given world. So the features that
appear in the absolute conception will be the ones that determine possible-worlds
contents-the properties. The features that determine centered-worlds contents-the
centering features-won't show up in the absolute conception. They'll only show up in
our particular, located, parochial conception.
Here are two alternative statements of the same idea: (i) If you fail to believe
some true possible-worlds proposition, then you've failed to completely characterize the
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world. Failure to believe all of the true centered-worlds contents, though, is compatible
with having completely characterized the world, though not your place within it. (ii) You
don't need centering features in order to draw the map right-all you need for that is
properties. You only need centering features in order to put the "you are here" arrow in
the right spot. And while all of the maximally well-informed inhabitants of a world have
got to agree on what the map looks like, they don't have to agree on where the "you are
here" arrow points.
This difference between properties and centering features-that all of our
maximally well-informed worldmates need to agree on which properties things have,
though they needn't agree on which centering features they have-promises to justify a
great deal of the rhetoric of less-than-full-reality (as well as the rhetoric of relativity) that
surrounds the secondary qualities.
Another bit of the rhetoric of less-than-full reality is that secondary qualities are
supposed to be, "not part of the world as it is in itself, but of the world as it is for us".
We can see how this is a natural way to describe centering features, too. Representations
with possible-worlds contents describe the world as it is in itself-they tell us (if they're
accurate) what the world is like. Representations with centered-worlds content describe
what the world is like for us-the tell us (if they're accurate) about our own individual
situation in the world; our own individual predicament. We can change how things are
represented as being for us without changing how the world is represented as being in
itself, because we can represent ourselves as being in a different predicament without
representing ourselves as being in a different world. (This is one of the main points of
the examples in Lewis (1979).)
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We also have a nice account of the relativity of secondary qualities. Colin
McGinn (1983) says that colors are secondary qualities, and wants it to be possible that (i)
the Martians attribute being green to the things we attribute being red to, and vice versa,
and (ii) we're both right. If colors are centering features, we can get things being green
for us and red for Martians, and vice versa. In general, we can get incompatible features
F and G such that one observer represents some object as F, another represents it as G,
and they're both right.30 We can also get the sort of change over time that McGinn
wants-if we were all taste-permuted in the right way, things that used to be sweet would
start being bitter. We'd still attribute the same features to things when we called them
'sweet' or 'bitter', but different things would have the features, because of the changes in
us (assuming being sweet, for example, is something like the centering feature, being
disposed to cause S sensations in me now).
It's far from clear that McGinn's right about how colors or tastes behave, but
that's not really the point. The point is to make sense of the possibility of there being
some features or other that act the way McGinn wants colors and tastes to act.3 1
We can also justify the sort of observer-dependence rhetoric that we encountered
in section 1. (The first pass through this will be fairly metaphorical. The metaphors are
cashed out in footnote 30.)
Take an ordinary possible world, without a center. Nothing has any centering
features there, because there's no center for them to bear the relevant relations to. Add
the "you are here" arrow, and things suddenly take on a number of new qualities-
30 See "Appearance Properties?"
31McGinn points out a number of suggestive analogies between indexicals and secondary qualities. One
of the things I want to do is explain the similarities-there are all these close analogies between secondary
qualities and indexicals because secondary qualities are centering features, which are close cousins of
indexical terms.
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qualities that they get not (or not entirely) in virtue of what the world is like in itself, but
in virtue of where the arrow points. It's quite natural to think of these features as being
added to the world by the selection of a center. The selection of a center-the adoption
of some subjective position within the world-provides the world with all of these
features which aren't present in the world considered on its own, without any center.
32
In the same way, centering features (unlike properties) disappear when you take
away the "you are here" arrow. Nothing's nearby or in my ear until you specify a center.
This looks like a satisfying sort of observer-dependence.
Note that we don't, even on the assumption that colors are centering features, get
the truth of, "if there had been no observers, nothing would've been colored". Lots of
merely possible things have dispositions to cause various responses in me, even the ones
in worlds where I don't exist (or don't have any counterparts). 33 The fact that the
centering features don't appear until we select a center seems like enough, though, to
justify (at least most of) the kind of observer-dependence and less-than-full-reality talk
32 Less metaphorically: models that only contain centerless worlds won't have the resources to provide
extensions for centering features. To assign an extension to a centering feature, you need to have a model
that picks out a privileged center. It's much like what happens with sentences involving "actually"-you
need a model that picks out a particular world as actual before you can assign them truth-values. Taking
the "absolute" view of logical space, where we don't single out a particular world as actual, we don't get
truth-values for anything that's got a significant occurrence of any rigidifying machinery. (See e.g. Davies
and Humberstone (1980).) In the same way, taking the "absolute" view of the world, where we don't
single out a particular location as mine, we don't get extensions for any centering features. An objective
model of the world-one that doesn't privilege a particular center-doesn't have the resources to deliver
extensions for centering features. Add the center, though, and you get extensions for the centering features.
33 Does attribution of dispositional centering features get us involved in the potentially unpleasant business
of trying to evaluate counterfactuals with centered-worlds propositions as antecedents and/or consequents?
No. To see why not, it's easiest to think about centered-worlds beliefs along Lewisian lines, as self-
ascriptions of properties. When I attribute a centering feature like, being disposed to cause G experiences
in me in C to Kermit, I'm self ascribing the property, being one of the things in which Kermit is disposed to
cause G experiences in circumstances C. That is, I'm taking myself to be one of the things of which some
open sentence along the lines of, "if x was in C, Kermit would cause G in x" is true. The only
counterfactual that needs to get evaluated here is one with possible-worlds propositions as both antecedent
and consequent.
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that many philosophers go in for when discussing the secondary qualities. 34 The
secondary qualities "fall away" when you take the objective, observer-independent
view-stop thinking from the perspective of some observer, and all of the secondary
qualities disappear. (See note 30 if you're worried about all the metaphors here.)
An example by way of summary: We need centered-worlds contents for belief
because we have beliefs not just about what the world is like, but also about our position
within it. When Sarah the transatlantic sailor consults her charts, sextant, and GPS, she's
not (primarily) deliberating and gathering evidence about how the world is-her main
concern is with her position within a world that she already knows most of the relevant
facts about.
If we have beliefs with centered-worlds contents, then we attribute centering
features to things. When Sarah believes that Gibraltar is nearby, she believes the
centered-worlds proposition that you get by applying the centering feature, being nearby,
to Gibraltar. If Sarah's belief is accurate, then she's correctly attributed a centering
feature to Gibraltar.
The centering feature that she attributes to Gibraltar is metaphysically second
class compared to properties of Gibraltar like being built around a big rock. The
property, unlike the centering feature, figures in the "absolute conception of the world"-
the conception that has to be shared by all of Sarah's maximally well-informed
worldmates. Since Sarah correctly attributes both being nearby and being built around a
big rock to Gibraltar, there's an interesting, metaphysically significant distinction in point
34 Though Galileo, at least, actually seems to have been advocating an error theory, on which we're
mistaken when we attribute colors to things. A nice feature of the view under consideration is that we can
make sense of the thought that seems to be motivating the error theory without being forced to actually be
error theorists.
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of objectivity between two kinds of features that Sarah correctly attributes to things in her
environment.
5. Centering Features in Language
Since it's very plausible that some of our propositional attitudes have centered-
worlds content, it's very plausible that we attribute centering features to objects in
thought. What's less clear is that we attribute centering features to objects in language.
It would be a shame for my account of the distinction between primary and
secondary qualities if we didn't have centering features being attributed to things in
language. If the primary/secondary quality distinction only shows up at the level of
features attributed in thought, it will be hard to justify the sorts of rhetoric that I'm
concerned to justify. All of that rhetoric happens in natural language, and it's supposed
to be about the features that are attributed to things by natural language predicates. So it
looks like a distinction that only appears at the level of thought, and not in language,
won't be able to do the work that I want it to do.
Another reason why it would be nice for me to have some natural language
predicates that express centering features is that the question of whether, for example,
colors, sounds, or tastes are secondary qualities is supposed to be one that admits of some
interesting debate. But if we only attribute centering features to things in thought, never
in language, the debate's going to be very short. Colors can't be centering features,
because the colors are the qualities that we attribute to things in sentences like "Kermit is
green" and "fire engines are red".
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One reason to be worried about whether or not the primary/secondary quality
distinction, as I've characterized it, does show up in natural language is that its doing so
has some surprising semantic consequences. If there are some predicates that express not
properties, but centering features, then there will (unless something very fancy is going
on) be some sentences of natural language that express centered-worlds propositions
rather than possible-worlds propositions. This is at odds with what standard semantic
theories tell us, and so it's going to require some motivation.
Another reason to be worried is that it seems, at least at a first glance, to conflict
with the attractive picture of assertion presented in Stalnaker (1978). 35 On Stalnaker's
picture, "the essential effect of an assertion it to change the presuppositions of the
participants in the conversation by adding the content of what is asserted to what is
presupposed." 36 So when I make some assertive utterance, it has the effect (if my
conversation partners cooperate) of adding the content of my utterance to our stock of
conversational presuppositions. Call an assertion that's heard and understood by all
parties to the conversation, doesn't meet with any objections, etc., a successful assertion.
The following constraint on the possible contents of sentences falls out of the
Stalnakerian account of assertion:
35 Stalnaker (1981: 147) discusses essentially this problem, pointing out that if assertions, like beliefs, are
self-ascriptions of properties, then our account of assertion will have to be more complicated than seems
plausible. Either communication is less direct and more inference-laden than we might have thought, or the
contents of assertion fail to match up with the contents of the beliefs expressed. More on this sort of
roblem in the next section.
6 Stalnaker (1978: 86).
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ASSERTION CONSTRAINT: If C is the content of some sentence S, then successful
assertions of S add C to the common presuppositions of the parties to
the conversation. 37
The constraint seems plausible, and the picture of assertion that produces it is, as
I've said, very attractive. But it's trouble for centered-worlds propositions as contents of
natural language sentences. (And so it's trouble for centering features as semantic values
of natural language predicates.) When I say "my pants are on fire", I had better not be
expressing the centered-worlds proposition that I believe when I believe that my pants are
on fire. When I say to you, in a growing panic, "my pants are on fire" it wouldn't serve
my purposes at all if you came to believe the centered-worlds proposition. If you did,
then you'd believe that your pants were on fire, and you'd start panicking, too, which
would be no use to anybody. 38
All the evidence points to the conclusion that what I'm trying to get you to come
to believe when I say "my pants are on fire" isn't the centered-worlds proposition that I
(and all the other well-informed people with burning pants) believe, but the possible-
worlds proposition that Egan's pants are on fire (which I probably also believe, along
with all of the other well-informed witnesses at the barbeque). So given the assertion
3 As stated, this only says anything about sentences which have the same content in every context. But
lots of sentences aren't like that. When a sentence includes indexicals, the sentence doesn't have any
particular content until we specify a context of utterance. Still, the assertion constraint will be true (or at
least plausible) for sentences that express the same proposition in every context, and that's where the
trouble is. Also, a similar thing is quite plausibly true for other sentences-if S has C in context T, then
successful assertions of S in T add C to the presuppositions. Same idea, but a little ickier to state.
38 I'll often talk about believing rather than presupposing in cases (like this one) where it's pretty clear that
the way in which a successful assertion of some sentence would get the parties to the conversation to
presuppose the sentence's content would be by getting them to believe it (and believe that everybody else
believes it, etc.).
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constraint, the content of (an utterance of) "my pants are on fire" had better be the
possible-worlds proposition, and not the centered-worlds proposition.
It's tempting to conclude from this that no assertion ever has the aim of adding a
centered-worlds proposition to the presuppositions of the conversation. Because they're
the sort of thing that's liable to be true evaluated relative to one party to the conversation
and false evaluated relative to another, centered-worlds contents can look like lousy
things to add to the conversational presuppositions, or to a stock of common beliefs. If
that's right, then, given the assertion constraint (and the plausible claim that every
declarative sentence of natural language can be used to make assertions), no centered-
worlds proposition would ever be the content of a natural language sentence, and so no
sentence of natural language would attribute a centering feature to anything.
But this is too fast. There are some motivations for taking the contents of at least
some natural language sentences to be centered-worlds propositions.
One motivation comes from the behavior of epistemic modals. There are some
phenomena that are extremely surprising and difficult to explain if we take the semantic
values of utterances of a sentence like "John might be in Cleveland" to be possible-
worlds propositions, but which are nicely explained by taking the semantic values of such
utterances to be centered-worlds propositions. 39 In fact, many of the sorts of phenomena
that motivate a centered-worlds semantics for epistemic "might" also seem to appear in
the case of "tastes great", "disgusting", and other predicates that look like good
candidates to be secondary-quality terms. I think that this is pretty good evidence that a
centering-feature account of the primary/secondary quality distinction is on the right
39 See Egan, Hawthorne, and Weatherson (forthoming) for details.
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track. However, a careful discussion of those features is a task for another paper, and so I
won't pursue it here.
Another motivation for allowing centered worlds propositions as semantic values
of utterances in natural language-the one that I'll emphasize here-parallels the
motivation for introducing centered-worlds propositions as the objects of propositional
attitudes.
Cases where people get lost in the library even though they know the floorplan
(and even where all of the people are) motivated us to say that the contents of belief were
centered-worlds propositions. When Carolina, lost in the Stanford library, deliberates
and gathers evidence about where she is, her deliberation and her evidence-gathering are
aimed at ruling out possibilities for her, not possibilities for the world. What she wants to
find out, first and foremost (and perhaps exclusively, if she's knowledgeable enough) is
not which world she's in, but which room she's in-which location she occupies, within
the world that she may already know that she inhabits. And the best way to model the
sort of sifting and sorting of possibilities that Carolina is engaged in when she's trying to
get oriented in the library is not in terms of sets of possible worlds, but sets of centered
worlds.
People sometimes get lost in groups. Groups of people can get lost in the library
together even when the floorplan, and the locations of all the groups of people in the
library, are common knowledge. The people in these groups can engage in collective
deliberation about where they are. Members of the group can, for example, make
assertions about where they (collectively) are, which other members of the group might
agree with or dissent from. It won't do any good, in this kind of situation, to make
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assertions about which world is actual-that could already be common knowledge.
Asserting some possible-worlds proposition would be no help. Again, the best way to
model the sort of sifting and sorting of possibilities that's going on in the collective
deliberations of lost groups is not in terms of sets of possible worlds, but sets of centered
worlds. The claims that members of the group make, agree with, and dissent from, must
have centered-worlds content, not possible-worlds content.40
So it looks like we need to have some assertions of centered-worlds propositions,
and for that we probably need centered-worlds contents for the natural language
utterances that are being used to make the assertions. This is enough, I think, to head off
the objection that no natural language sentence ever has centered-worlds content, and
therefore no natural language predicate expresses a centering feature. There's good
reason to think that not every utterance has (interesting) centered-worlds content (e.g.
'Oakland is near San Francisco'), but the possibility of collective deliberation in lost-
group cases gives us good reason to think that some of them do. And that's enough to
leave a space for centering features as semantic values of natural language predicates.
6. Self-Locating Assertion
To the extent that you're worried about the prospects of a theory of
communication that can accommodate self-locating assertion, it's reasonable to be
worried about allowing centered-worlds propositions as contents of natural language
sentences. In order to assuage such worries, I'll sketch a generalization of Stalnaker's
(1978) treatment of assertion that allows for assertions with centered-worlds contents.
40 There's a question about whether the sorts of centered worlds we want here are the same as the sort that
we want for paradigm cases of self-locating belief. Do we want worlds centered on individuals, or worlds
centered on groups? More on this in the next section.
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The underlying thought behind the Stalnaker approach is that in conversation,
deliberation, and debate, people seek to distinguish between possibilities. The way in
which they distinguish between possibilities for the world-possible ways for the world
to be-has received a great deal of attention. The way in which people distinguish, in
conversation, between possibilities for them-possible positions that they might occupy
in the world-has received less.
The Stalnaker Framework
On the original framework, the sort of possibilities we're distinguishing between
are possibilities for the world. As the conversation progresses, if things go well, we
collectively narrow down the range of live options for how the world might be. More
propositions come to be presupposed by all parties to the conversation, and so the class of
worlds that are compatible with the conversation's presuppositions gets smaller.
A proposition is presupposed by a speaker iff the speaker takes it that all parties
to the conversation accept the proposition, take each other to accept it, take each other to
know that everyone else accepts it, etc.
A presupposition is shared iff it's presupposed by all parties to the conversation.
A speaker's context set is the set of worlds compatible with all of a speaker's
presuppositions.
A nondefective context is one in which all parties to the conversation have the
same presuppositions, and therefore all share a common context set.
A defective context is one in which some party to the conversation presupposes
some proposition that another party to the conversation does not.
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The function of assertion-what Stalnaker calls the essential effect of assertion-
is to add the content of the assertion to the conversation's shared presuppositions, and
reduce the common context set (assuming that the context is nondefective) by removing
all of the worlds that aren't compatible with what's been asserted.
It's natural to think about this in terms of speaker intentions-when I assert that p,
I'm trying to get the other parties to the conversation to believe (or at least accept) that p.
This isn't quite right, though. We sometimes make assertions that we know won't be
accepted, with the intention of achieving some other effect. This doesn't mean that we
should revise our account of the essential effect of assertion. When we make assertions
knowing that they won't be accepted, we're exploiting the usual role of assertion-the
essential effect of assertion-in order to achieve some secondary effect.
Let's look at a garden-variety example of assertion. Suppose Sarah and Liz are in
the middle of their transatlantic voyage, and Liz sincerely asserts, "the Azores are 800
miles from Lisbon". Liz is expressing a belief-a belief that the Azores are 800 miles
from Lisbon-by uttering a sentence that expresses the proposition that she believes.
This content is a set of possible worlds: all of the worlds in which the Azores are 800
miles from Lisbon. The effect of Liz's assertion, if Sarah does not object (and let's
suppose that she does not) is to add the proposition that the Azores are 800 miles from
Lisbon to the shared presuppositions (and, probably, to Sarah's beliefs). After the
assertion, both Liz and Sarah presuppose that the Azores are 800 miles from Lisbon. The
context set is diminished by excluding all of the worlds in which the Azores are some
other distance from Lisbon.
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Whether or not this helps them in their navigational tasks depends on whether
they know anything about their own position relative to either Lisbon or the Azores. If
they're in a lost-in-the-library-type situation, where they both know all of the relevant
geographical facts, and the locations of all of the boats with two-woman crews on the
Atlantic, but are ignorant about which of those boats is theirs (and therefore which of the
crews is them), then it won't be any help at all. All that assertions about the distances
between islands and cities can do is rule out some worlds as candidates for actuality. But
Liz and Sarah already know (let us suppose) which world they're in. What they need is
information about where in the world they are-information that rules out not possible
worlds, but possible predicaments.
Generalizing
The obvious way to generalize the framework is just to say exactly the same
things, except replacing 'possible world' everywhere with 'centered world'. (This counts
as a generalization because what happens in the special case where all of the centered-
worlds propositions under consideration are boring will be exactly what happens in the
original framework.) Participants in a conversation are still collectively distinguishing
between possibilities, but they're distinguishing between possibilities for them, rather
than possibilities for the world. Presuppositions will be centered-worlds propositions,
411and the context set will be a set of centered worlds.41
41 Note: So far as everything I've said so far goes, it's still an open question which sentences have
centered-worlds contents (or interesting ones). Admitting centered-worlds contents doesn't force us to say
that, for example, all sentences involving indexicals express (interesting) centered-worlds contents. All I'm
committed to saying is that sentences with predicates that express (interesting) centering features have
(interesting) centered-worlds contents (usually, barring fanciness about embedding, etc.).
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Sarah consults her navigational equipment and sincerely asserts, "the Azores are
nearby". Suppose that "nearby" expresses a centering feature, and so the sentence
42
expresses a centered-worlds proposition.42 Since her utterance is sincere, Sarah expresses
one of her beliefs by uttering a sentence with the same content. The content of both
Sarah's belief and her assertion is the centered-worlds proposition that includes all and
only those <<i, t>, w> pairs such that i is near the Azores at t in w. The effect of Sarah's
assertion, if Liz does not object (and let's suppose that she does not) is to add the
centered-worlds proposition that the Azores are nearby to the conversation's shared
presuppositions (and probably to Liz's beliefs). After the assertion, both Liz and Sarah
presuppose that the Azores are nearby. The context set is diminished by eliminating all
of the <<i, t>, w> triples such that i is not near the Azores at t in w.
This gets the effect that we want-Sarah is able to express her self-locating belief
by making an assertion with the same content as her belief; when Liz accepts Sarah's
assertion, she comes to share Sarah's belief. This fits nicely with the intuitive model of
communication according to which people express their beliefs in assertions which, if
accepted, bring it about that the belief is shared by the other parties to the conversation.
(I'm abstracting away from complications about forms of acceptance other than belief
here, but I think nothing hangs on this.)
Allowing self-locating assertion requires us to recognize a new way for an
assertion to be defective. Since centered-worlds propositions are liable to be true relative
to some people in a world but not relative to other people in the same world, there's a
danger of asserting something that's true (plausible, etc.) relative to some, but not all,
42 It's almost certain that "nearby" doesn't always express a centering feature (at least, it doesn't always
express an interesting one). This is a potential source of trouble for a compositional semantics that delivers
interesting centered worlds contents for all and only the sentences that ought to have them.
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parties to the conversation. So we might have grounds to reject some self-locating
assertion-to resist adding it to our stock of conversational presuppositions-not because
it's false relative to our own predicament, but because we have good reason to think that
it's false relative to the predicament of some party to the conversation, and as such a bad
thing to accept, take everyone else to accept, take everyone else to take everyone else to
accept, etc. There are some wrinkles here that need exploring. But for now let's pass on
to other things.
7. Two Worries
There are two worries that I'd like to address briefly before closing.
First, there's a concern about whether the communication of centered-worlds
propositions has to be semantic, rather than pragmatic. And if communication of self-
locating content is a pragmatic phenomenon, we don't have any reason to think that there
are predicates that express centering features, and we're left with a not-very-satisfying
account of the distinction between primary and secondary qualities.
I have three responses to this worry: First response: centered-worlds semantics
seems to be independently motivated. (See Egan, Hawthorne, and Weatherson (2004) for
such a motivation.) 4 3 ,4 4 Second response: even if we relegate the conveyance of
centered-worlds contents to pragmatics, we still need the fancier story about
43 Note in particular that "tastes great", for example, seems to give rise to the same puzzling phenomena
that motivate a semantics that delivers centered-worlds propositions as the semantic values of many
sentences that include epistemic "might"s.
44Comesafia (2002) gives us another reason to want a semantics that assigns centered-worlds contents to
some natural language utterances-if he's right, "justified" expresses, at least on one of its uses, a centering
feature. So, sentences like "my belief that I have a hand is justified" will express centered-worlds
propositions. Comesafia's account is very attractive-it does a lot of work in resolving some difficult
puzzles about justification-and so it provides some extra motivation for a semantics that allows for
utterances with centered-worlds contents.
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communication. Just because the self-locating content is being communicated
pragmatically doesn't mean we don't need a story about how the communication works.
So it's not clear how big the payoff really is for relegating the communication of self-
locating content to pragmatics. Finally, there doesn't seem to be, in lost-group cases, the
sort of indirection or sense of moving to a repair strategy that's suggestive of
communicating something other than the semantic content of the utterance that's used for
the communication.
. A second worry: in claiming that the communication of centered-worlds
propositions is a semantic phenomenon, I've committed myself to the existence of some
compositional semantics that delivers the right centered-worlds propositions as the
semantic values of the right sentences of natural language. And perhaps we should be
worried about the prospects for such a compositional semantics.
This is, I think, a reasonable thing to be concerned about, but there doesn't seem
to be any principled reason to be skeptical about the prospects of such a theory. Of
course, the details will, eventually, have to be spelled out. But at least at the beginning of
the project, there doesn't seem to be any particular grounds for pessimism.
Conclusion
Centering features display a lot of the behavior that's supposed to be distinctive of
the secondary qualities-behavior that's hard to find in any kind of property. So the
distinction between properties and centering features seems to be a good place to locate
the primary/secondary quality distinction. If we're going to locate the distinction there,
and still have an interesting question about whether, for example, the colors are primary
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or secondary qualities, we'll need to say that some natural language sentences express
(interesting) centered-worlds propositions. This requires a revision in our account of
assertion, and to our semantic theories, which might seem to be a high cost. But the
revisions are independently motivated (by the possibility of collective self-locating
discussion, debate, etc.), and there seem to be some promising ways to undertake them.
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Introduction
Sydney Shoemaker introduces appearance properties in order to reconcile
intentionalism with the possibility of spectrum inversion without misrepresentation. 1 In
introducing appearance properties, Shoemaker does two things: he proposes a theoretical
role for some family of properties to play, and he suggests a candidate family of
properties to play that role. I'll argue that his proposed candidates do not play the role as
well as we would like, and suggest some new candidates. The reason for the question
mark in the title is that, if I'm right, it turns out that the best candidates to play the
appearance-property role aren't properties.
1. Intentionalism and Spectrum Inversion
Intentionalists hold that the phenomenal character of an intentional mental state
supervenes on its representational content. So, if intentionalism is true, there can't be
two visual experiences that are alike in their representational content, but differ in their
phenomenal character.
Suppose Ernie and Vert are spectrum inverted with respect to each other. Ernie's
visual experiences when he looks at ripe tomatoes, fire engines, and cooked lobsters are
2phenomenologically just like ours. Vert's visual experiences are phenomenally inverted.
His experiences when he looks at ripe tomatoes, fire engines, and cooked lobsters are
1 Shoemaker (1994, 2000, 2001). In these papers he calls them 'phenomenal properties'. He's recently
changed his terminology (in Shoemaker (forthcoming)), and I follow him in the new terminology here.
2 Let's assume for simplicity that there isn't any actual spectrum inversion, so that our visual experiences
really are the same.
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phenomenally like our (and Ernie's) visual experiences when we look at unripe tomatoes,
limes, and uncooked lobsters. We can put this in terms of the qualitative properties of
Ernie's and Vert's experiences by saying that Ernie's visual experience of Kermit is G,
while Vert's is R, where a G experience is one with the phenomenal character of our
experiences of unripe tomatoes, etc., and an R experience is one with the phenomenal
character of our experiences of ripe tomatoes, etc.
Suppose also that Ernie and Vert are (in relevant respects) historically and
behaviorally indistinguishable. They both use color terms in the same way, they both put
things into the same piles when asked to sort them by color, and so on. For example,
when Ernie and Vert look at Kermit, they both say "he's green", and they both stack
Kermit in the pile with the unripe tomatoes and uncooked lobsters when asked to sort
things by color. A natural interpretation of this case is that it's one in which Ernie and
Vert are phenomenally spectrum inverted, but their visual experiences agree on the colors
of things. Their visual experiences both represent Kermit as being green, even though
their phenomenal character is different. 3
Let's suppose that this kind of case-in which two observers are phenomenally
inverted, though their visual experiences have the same color content-is possible.4 Then
we seem to have a counterexample to intentionalism.
However, an important part of the argument was suppressed in the previous
paragraphs. Why should we agree that Ernie's and Vert's visual experiences have the
same (overall) representational content? Here is a plausible argument: if Ernie's and
3 At least, it's natural if you've got certain theoretical commitments. In particular, it's natural if you're a
sufficiently thoroughgoing externalist.
4 For some arguments that it's not, see e.g. Byrne and Hilbert (1997b), Harman (1990), Hilbert and
Kalderon (2000), and Stalnaker (2000). Note that if Stalnaker is right, then it's not just that we can't have
cases like this-it's that it doesn't event make sense to talk about cases like this.
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Vert's experiences don't differ with respect to color content, they don't differ with
respect to representational content at all (or at least, not in any way that's potentially
relevant). The only available place to locate a representational difference between
Ernie's and Vert's experiences is in which colors their visual experiences represent
Kermit as having. So since Ernie's and Vert's experiences have the same color content
(both represent Kermit as being green), they have the same representational content
simpliciter. This is the step that Shoemaker's proposal (which will be discussed in what
follows) is designed to undermine.
2. A Bunch of Distinctions, a Problem, and Another Distinction
Before moving on to Shoemaker's proposal, we should pause to head off an
alternative line of response to the conflict between intentionalism and the possibility of
spectrum inversion without error.
Contentful experiences have representational properties. One kind of
representational property is the property of having a certain content. There are a lot of
competing ideas about what contents are, but all parties to the debate must concede that
representations have at least the following sort of content: they make a distinction
between the possibilities in which things are as they're represented to be, and the
possibilities in which things are otherwise. Maybe there are other, more fine-grained
kinds of contents, too, but if there are, those kinds of finer-grained contents will each at
least determine a coarse-grained possibility-carving content of the sort described above.
So one (fairly coarse-grained) sort of representational property is the class of
possibility-carving properties. The paradigm cases of these are the properties of having a
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certain possible-worlds content. Call these possibility-carving properties the pure
representational properties. (I will, from now on, stipulatively use 'content' to mean
'possibility-carving content'. 5 I don't mean to commit myself to any view about which
notions of content are viable, theoretically useful, etc. by making this stipulation-I just
need a less cumbersome expression than 'possibility-carving content', and I won't be
employing any of the competing notions in what follows.)
When Grover believes, Oscar asserts, Miss Piggy fears, and Ernie and Vert see
that Kermit is a frog, Grover's belief, Oscar's assertion, Miss Piggy's fear, and Ernie's
and Vert's visual experiences all share a pure representational property. They all have
contents that separate the worlds in which Kermit is a frog from the rest.
There are other kinds of representational properties. For example, visually
representing that Kermit is a frog, or representing Kermit, under mode of presentation K,
as a frog. Call these the impure representational properties. We can think of the pure
representational properties as very general properties of representing content C somehow-
or-other, and the impure representational properties as properties of representing content
C this way.6
The intentionalist slogan is, "same representational properties, same phenomenal
character". The distinction between pure and impure representational properties lets us
draw a distinction between two sorts of intentionalism. Pure intentionalism says that the
phenomenal character of experience supervenes on the pure representational properties of
s For now, it does no harm to read 'possibility-carving content' as 'possible-worlds content'. I'm hedging
now, though, because the difference will matter later on.
6 This more or less follows Chalmers' distinction between pure and impure representational properties in
Chalmers (forthcoming). The notion of content I've employed is more restrictive than his, though. It's
actually a bit more restrictive than I need for the points I'm about to make, but it's difficult to state the
weaker notion in a happy way.
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experience. Impure intentionalism says only that phenomenal character supervenes on
impure representational properties.
Let's also distinguish between maximal and submaximal representational
properties of both kinds. Maximal representational properties specify the content (or the
content plus the manner of representation) of an experience exhaustively, while
submaximal representational properties specify only part of the content of the
experience. 7 So pure intentionalism says that maximal pure representational properties fix
phenomenal character, while impure intentionalism makes the weaker claim that maximal
impure representational properties fix phenomenal character.
If it's possible to have both an occurrent thought (or some other sort of cognitive
experience) and a visual experience with the same maximal pure representational
properties, then pure intentionalism is false. (Since while the visual experience will have
some distinctive phenomenal character, having the thought either won't have any
phenomenal character at all, or will have a very different one than that of the visual
experience with the same content). Since this is almost certainly possible, pure
intentionalism is almost certainly false. Call this the problem of common content. So it
looks as if the intentionalist will have to appeal to impure representational properties in
order to make her thesis plausible, given that there are some maximal pure
representational properties that can be shared by experiences in different modalities
(visual, cognitive, auditory, etc.). 8
7 More carefully, and more generally: for any kind of property K, a property F is a maximal K property iff,
for any K property G, something's having F either entails that it has G or entails that it lacks G. That is, F
is a maximal K property iff something's having F fixes all of its K properties.
8 Alex Byrne (2001) discusses this sort of problem, and makes what I take to be the same distinction
between varieties of intentionalism (though under a slightly different mode of presentation). He also offers
some reasons for resisting this argument against pure intentionalism, so things are probably not so clear as
I've suggested. (For one thing, while it's clear that experiences in different modalities can share very many
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So why be so worried about the sort of spectrum inversion case described above?
What this case is a clear counterexample to is pure intentionalism, and we already knew
that that was false, because of the problem of common content. For all that's been said
so far, it could be that Ernie's and Vert's experiences have the same possibility-carving
content, but they each represent it in different ways. They might, for example, each
represent the property being green under a different mode of presentation.9 So Ernie's
and Vert's experiences would share all of their pure representational properties, while
differing in their impure representational properties. Since the intentionalist already
needs to appeal to impure representational properties to handle the problem of common
content, where's the harm in appealing to them here as well?
Notice a distinction between two kinds of impure representational properties.
First, there are impure representational properties like visually representing that Fozzie is
on stage, auditorily representing that there's a rooster nearby, and representing in belief
that no armadillo weighs more than any aircraft carrier. These are impure because they
specify the sensory or cognitive modality in which the content is being represented. Call
these representational properties modality-impure. Everybody has to concede that our
experiences have modality-impure representational properties-it's just a plain fact that
there are a number of different representational modalities. (Not everybody has to
concede that these properties are theoretically interesting, but everybody does have to
concede that our experiences have them.)
submaximal representational properties, it's actually much less clear that they can share maximal
representational properties). Thanks to Alex Byrne and James John for discussion. See John (2004) for
more details.
9 See Chalmers (forthcoming) for such an account.
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Compare these to impure representational properties like, represents that Fozzie is
on stage (where Fozzie is presented under mode C), represents that Fozzie is on stage
(where Fozzie is presented under mode S), and represents that Kermit is green (where
being green is presented under mode G). Call these representational properties, which
are impure because they specify modes of presentation for some of the things
represented, mode-of-presentation impure, or MOP-impure. Not everyone will want to
concede that our experiences have MOP-impure representational properties. It's a
controversial bit of theory that there are different modes of presentation under which we
represent things (and properties). So while appealing to modality-impure
representational properties to rescue intentionalism from the problem of common content
is relatively theoretically innocent, appealing to MOP-impure representational properties
requires some substantial theoretical commitments.
An intentionalism that allows for differences in phenomenal character due to
differences in modality-impure representational properties, but not due to MOP-impure
representational properties, is a close relative of pure intentionalism. It's a theory in
which pure intentionalism is true within each modality, though not across modalities.
Call such a theory a modality-specific pure intentionalist theory. Within a given
representational modality, phenomenal character supervenes on pure representational
properties-no two experiences in the same modality can differ in their phenomenal
character without differing in their pure representational properties.10 This is the sort of
intentionalist theory that I'll be concerned to square with the possibility of the
10 This distinction is the same as Byrne's (2001) distinction between intermodal and intramodal
intentionalism.
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problematic cases of spectrum inversion. (I think that it's the sort of intentionalist theory
that Shoemaker is concerned with, as well.)
Modality-specific pure intentionalism is an attractive view because it seems to be
the version of intentionalism with the fewest possible theoretical commitments-it will
put fewer constraints on what we're allowed to say in the rest of our theorizing than a
version that, for example, appeals to MOP-impure representational properties as well."
Cases of spectrum inversion without misrepresentation are prima facie counterexamples
to such a theory, since Ernie and Vert are both having visual experiences with the same
(possibility-carving) content. Shoemaker's introduction of appearance properties is a
promising line of response to these apparent counterexamples.
3. Appearance Properties
Shoemaker's strategy is to deny the claim that Ernie's and Vert's experiences
differ with respect to representational content only if they differ with respect to color
content. Intentionalism is to be saved by supposing that, while Ernie's and Vert's
experiences both represent Kermit as being green, there is a representational difference
with respect to the other properties that they attribute to Kermit.
The theoretical motivation for this move is pretty clear: adding an extra layer of
content to visual experience allows us to agree that Ernie's and Vert's experiences are the
same with respect to color content, while denying that they're the same with respect to
" Though one thing that might happen is that (a) it turns out that an intentionalism that appeals to MOP-
impure representational properties is much less messy than one that doesn't, and (b) we're unavoidably
committed to modes of presentation anyway, for independent reasons. If that's how things shake out, then
we'll probably (assuming that we want to be intentionalists of some stripe) want to go with the MOP-
impure version of intentionalism. But it's not at all clear that that is how things will shake out, and
anyway, there's an interesting chunk of theoretical space to get mapped out here-what's the best story for
a modality-impure intentionalist to tell about spectrum inversion?
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representational content simpliciter. So we can be intentionalists (modality-impure
intentionalists, that is-this qualification is hereafter omitted) while allowing for the
possibility of spectrum inversion without misrepresentation.
The addition of an extra layer of content also has some appeal at a less theoretical
level. The intuitive idea behind the proposal is that, while Ernie's and Vert's experiences
agree about what color Kermit is, they still, in some sense or other, represent him as
looking different. So there should be some range of properties that aren't colors, but still
mark differences in how things look, with respect to which Ernie's visual experience is
different from Vert's. 12
This identifies a role that we'd like to have some properties to play-marking a
difference in how things (representationally) look to Ernie and Vert that isn't a difference
in which colors their visual experience attributes to things. Call whichever properties (if
any) play this role the appearance properties, and call the one that Ernie represents
Kermit as having 'PG' (for 'phenomenal green') and the one Vert represents him as
having 'PR' (for 'phenomenal red'). 13 Now the proponent of appearance properties has
an important question to answer-which properties are the appearance properties,
exactly? For our purposes, we can treat this as the question, which properties are PG and
12 This isn't, by itself, a sufficient motivation for positing some further sort of content with respect to which
Ernie's and Vert's experiences differ. Given that there is (at least in philosophical parlance) a distinction
between intentional and phenomenal senses of 'seems' (one that Shoemaker (1982) either helpfully points
out or perniciously introduces, depending on your view of the distinction), we might well want to say that
there's a similar distinction between intentional and phenomenal senses of 'looks', and that things look
different to them only in the phenomenal sense.
13 These names are due to Shoemaker's old terminology, on which the appearance properties were called
phenomenal properties.
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PR? We should be skeptical about the prospects of the appeal to appearance properties
until we've been given some idea of what these properties are, exactly. 14
Let's look at the role that the appearance properties are supposed to play in some
more detail. There are some constraints on what the appearance properties can be like, if
they're going to allow us to reconcile intentionalism with the possibility of spectrum
inversion without misrepresentation. For ease of presentation, I'll state them as
constraints on what our two particular appearance properties-PG and PR-can be like.
The generalizations should be clear enough.
DIFFERENCE: Ernie's and Vert's experiences have to represent Kermit as having
different appearance properties. So it has to turn out that PG # PR.
It's pretty clear why we need this. What we need in order to reconcile the
phenomenal difference between Ernie's and Vert's experiences with the intentionalist's
supervenience claim is an accompanying representational difference. Adding more
content to their visual experiences won't help unless the content we add to Ernie's
experience is different from the content we add to Vert's.
14 IS it so clear that we need to be given an informative account of which properties are the appearance
properties? Yablo (1995) has argued that sometimes we ought to resist these sorts of demands for
alternative specifications of which property F is-sometimes the specification that the objector wants an
alternative to is the best one that's available. This seems pretty plausible for already well-entrenched
properties, but not so good for newly introduced, theoretically motivated properties. Plausibly, we're not
obliged to say which property being red is in any more informative terms. If, on the other hand, I introduce
some property as whichever property plays fancy theoretical role R, then I think that I am under some
obligation to show that there really is some antecedently respectable property that can play role R. In
particular, in the case where I'm introducing a property as the one represented in a certain kind of
experience, I'll need to say something at least a little bit informative about how things are represented as
being in those experiences, and this will require saying something about the nature of the represented
property.
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CORRECTNESS: Ernie's and Vert's visual experiences should both be representing
Kermit correctly when they represent him as being, respectively, PG and PR.
There are two motivations for this constraint. First, we're trying to find a way to
reconcile intentionalism with the possibility of spectrum inversion without
misrepresentation, and it would be strange to do this by simply relocating the
misrepresentation-it would be strange to avoid having to attribute misrepresentation of
color properties by replacing it with an attribution of misrepresentation of appearance
properties. (Though maybe this is not as bad-maybe it's better to have systematic error
about weird, esoteric properties than to have systematic error about ordinary, everyday
properties like colors.)
Second, and more persuasively, denying CORRECTNESS will force us to say
that either Ernie's or Vert's visual experience, or both, systematically misrepresents the
world (since one or both will represent things as having appearance properties that they
don't have). Picking one or the other to be getting things right would be objectionably
arbitrary. Saying that they're both getting things wrong requires us to attribute a lot of
systematic misrepresentation (not just to Ernie and Vert, but in our own case, as well) and
this ought to be avoided if possible.' 5
It's worth noticing a requirement that follows from CORRECTNESS and the
constraint that Ernie's and Vert's visual experiences agree on their color content:
'5 Though see Boghossian & Velleman (1989). Thau (2001) leaves it open that visual experience might
systematically misrepresent things as having a special range of properties that they don't actually have.
-85-
Appearance Properties?
NOVELTY: The appearance properties aren't the colors. In particular, PG isn't being
green and PR isn't being red.
(This is worth noticing because some of Shoemaker's candidates wind up looking
suspiciously color-like.)
The above requirements are non-negotiable. No properties that fail to satisfy
them can be the appearance properties, because they can't play the right role in
reconciling intentionalism with the possibility of spectrum inversion, which is the whole
reason for wanting to have appearance properties around in the first place.
There are three more features that it would be nice to have in the appearance
properties, because they're intuitively well motivated, but which aren't absolutely
required in order to do the work appearance properties were introduced to do.
SAMENESS: The appearance property that Ernie's visual experience attributes to
Kermit is the same as the appearance property that Vert's visual experience
attributes to, for example, cooked lobsters and ripe tomatoes. 16
The idea here is that phenomenal spectrum inversion should go hand in hand with
representational appearance property inversion. The reason why Ernie's and Vert's
16 Don't be thrown off by the presence of both a DIFFERENCE and a SAMENESS requirement-I'm not
imposing contradictory demands on the appearance properties. (At least, not yet.) DIFFERENCE requires
that the appearance properties that Ernie's visual experience attributes to Kermit be different from the one
Vert's experience attributes to Kermit. SAMENESS requires that the appearance property that Ernie's
visual experience attributes to Kermit be the same as the one that Vert's experience attributes to ripe
tomatoes.
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visual experiences are phenomenally inverted is that they are representationally inverted
with respect to certain appearance properties.' 7
So if Ernie's visual experience represents paradigm green things as being PG and
Vert's represents them as PR, Ernie's visual experience should represent paradigm red
things as PR and Vert's should represent them as PG. The appearance property,
representation of which underlies the phenomenal character of Ernie's experience of
green things (like Kermit) should be the same as the appearance property, representation
of which underlies the phenomenal character of Vert's experience of red things like ripe
tomatoes.
The intuitive idea behind appearance properties is that they're the properties,
representation of which underlies, explains, or maybe just is, the phenomenal character of
our experiences.' 8 If we want to hang on to that claim, then we'll want to have
SAMENESS. Then we can say that the reason why Ernie's and Vert's phenomenology is
inverted is because the appearance property content of their visual experiences is
inverted. The reason why Ernie's experiences of ripe tomatoes are like Vert's
experiences of unripe ones is because the (salient, phenomenal-character-determining)
property that Ernie's visual experience attributes to ripe tomatoes is the same one that
Vert's experience attributes to unripe ones. Without SAMENESS, we don't have this
explanation available.
17 Another way to put the requirement: it's not just that for having a certain maximal intentional property
necessitates that an experience has a certain maximal phenomenal property, but that some submaximal
intentional properties (like representing something as PG), are such that any experience that has them also
has some (submaximal) phenomenal property.
18 Shoemaker commits himself to this when he says that an acceptable account of the relation between
phenomenal character and representational content will hold that "it is of the essence of any given quale
that its instantiation by an experience makes a certain determinate contribution to that experience's
phenomenal character" (Shoemaker 1994: 28).
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CONTRARINESS: PG and PR should be contraries-Ernie should be able to learn,
when he sees that Kermit is PG, that Kermit is not PR.
When Ernie learns that Kermit looks that way, he should learn that Kermit
doesn't look (in the relevant respect) the way a ripe tomato looks, or the way Kermit
looks to Vert. Mutatis mutandis for Vert.
There's an obvious problem with CONTRARINESS-it's inconsistent with
CORRECTNESS. If Ernie's experience represents Kermit as PG, and Vert's represents
him as PR, and they're both correct, then Kermit is both PG and PR, so PG and PR can't
be incompatible in the way that CONTRARINESS seems to require. So it seems a bit
odd to look for a proposal that gives us CONTRARINESS, given that it's inconsistent
with one of our non-negotiable desiderata.
Here are three things to say in response to this concern about whether or not we
ought to be at all concerned about trying to satisfy CONTRARINESS: First, it turns out
that the requirements of CONTRARINESS and CORRECTNESS can be reconciled, if
we adopt the right view about what kinds of feature are attributed to things in experience.
(I'll explain how to effect the reconciliation in sections 5-7.) Second, Shoemaker seems
to be right about the intuitive attractiveness of CONTRARINESS, and so a proposal that
preserved it would be better than one that gave it up. Finally, given SAMENESS, there's
a principled theoretical motivation for wanting CONTRARINESS.
There are some incompatibilities at the level of phenomenal character. The
distinctive phenomenal feature of experience that goes along with representing something
as PG is incompatible with the distinctive phenomenal feature of experience that goes
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along with representing that thing as PR.19 So given SAMENESS, it looks like it's
impossible to have a visual experience that, for example, represents Kermit as both PG
and PR-there's a certain sort of representational content that's not available to us (or at
least, not available in visual experience). If PG and PR are contraries-if nothing can be
both PG and PR-then it's not very surprising that we can't represent anything as both
PG and PR. If PG and PR aren't contraries-if things can be both PG and PR, but we
can't represent them that way-then we've got a brute restriction on which of the
perfectly possible states of affairs (of a kind that visual experience is in the business of
representing) we're capable of representing in visual experience. This seems to be
exactly the sort of consideration that makes us so sure that being red and being green are
contraries. It would be nice to have CONTRARINESS in order to avoid this sort of brute
restriction on our representational capacities.20
Another desideratum that Shoemaker (1994) proposes is
CONSTANCY: The appearance properties should be features that are had by things even
when unobserved.
19 The incompatibility isn't between G and R, but between some very much more specific, extremely
difficult to describe phenomenal properties. There may be a horrible problem lurking in this neighborhood,
but if there is, it's one that I won't be able to discuss here. So I pass over it in near-silence, hoping that no
one will make a fuss.20 It's reasonable to worry about how much we ought to trust the inference from our inability to represent a
situation in which P in visual experience to the impossibility of P. It's pretty clearly not reliable across the
board. We can avoid a lot of the apparent counterexamples by restricting our attention to the sorts of
situations that visual experience is in the business of representing (the colors and shapes of medium-sized
physical objects, for example, but not much of anything about the very small or the abstract, and not the
densities, origins, or futures even of the medium-sizers). We also ought to make sure that we don't claim
an entailment between inability to represent and impossibility.
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This is certainly the least well motivated of the desiderata. For one thing, it's not
so clear how much of a pretheoretical, intuitive picture of the nature of appearance
properties we really have, and we need a pretty detailed one to motivate this desideratum.
For another, it's not clear how much any picture we do have ought to constrain what we
say about properties that are so theoretically motivated and distant from ordinary talk.
In fact, in more recent work, Shoemaker appeals to two kinds of appearance
properties, only one of which satisfies CONSTANCY. But still, CONSTANCY does
sound pretty plausible on its face-I think that the intuition Shoemaker appeals to is
there, even if tentative and of uncertain authority.
4. Finding the Appearance Properties
To make the sort of move Shoemaker is proposing work, we need to find some
candidates to be the appearance properties. The successful candidate will be the one (if
any) that does the best job of satisfying all of the desiderata. It will have to satisfy all of
the minimal desiderata-DIFFERENCE (PG and PR have to be distinct), NOVELTY
(the appearance properties can't be the colors), and CORRECTNESS (neither Ernie nor
Vert is misrepresenting Kermit). It will also have to do a better job than the other
candidates of satisfying the 'bonus' desiderata: SAMENESS (the property that Ernie
attributes to Kermit is the one that Vert attributes to cooked lobsters), CONSTANCY
(things can have appearance properties while unobserved) and CONTRARINESS (when
Ernie learns that Kermit is PG, he learns that Kermit is not PR).
Shoemaker considers two candidates to be the appearance properties. One of
them satisfies the minimal desiderata and SAMENESS, but satisfies neither
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CONSTANCY nor CONTRARINESS. The other appears, at a first pass, to satisfy the
minimal desiderata plus CONSTANCY. This seemingly better candidate, however, is
actually ambiguous between three different proposals. On closer examination, two of
these fail to meet the minimal desiderata, and the third delivers an implausible result
about the appearance properties of non-actual things (and also fails to respect the
intuition that motivates CONSTANCY). None satisfy CONTRARINESS, and all have
some difficulty with NOVELTY.
The first of Shoemaker's candidates is the family of properties like currently
producing a G experience in some observer. (Recall that a G experience is one with the
phenomenal character of our, and Ernie's, experiences of unripe tomatoes, limes, and
uncooked lobsters, and an R experience is one with the phenomenal character of our
experiences of ripe tomatoes, fire trucks, and cooked lobsters.) 21
This satisfies DIFFERENCE, CORRECTNESS, NOVELTY, and SAMENESS,
but not CONSTANCY or CONTRARINESS. It satisfies DIFFERENCE because
something can be causing a G experience but not an R experience, and vice versa, so
something can be PG without being PR (and vice versa). It satisfies CORRECTNESS
because Kermit is causing a G experience in Ernie and an R experience in Vert, and so he
really is both PG and PR. NOVELTY is satisfied, since it's clear that the colors aren't
these kinds of properties-the colors of things don't depend on their being presently
perceived. Finally, it satisfies SAMENESS because it's clear that the property Ernie's
21 Note that this won't give us a reductive intentionalism, since the representational properties are
characterized in terms of phenomenal properties of experience. A nonreductive intentionalism is still worth
pursuing, though. The question of the relation between representational content and phenomenal character
is interesting independent of its connections to the mind-body debate, and the view that the connections are
very, very close is quite attractive, independent of its consequences elsewhere.
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visual experience attributes to Kermit is the one that Vert's attributes to ripe tomatoes,
and vice versa.
It doesn't satisfy CONSTANCY because Kermit won't be producing any G or R
experiences in observers when he's not being observed, and it doesn't satisfy
CONTRARINESS because Kermit is both PG and PR, which shows that they're not
contraries. Shoemaker (2000) dismisses these properties in favor of the next candidates
22because of their failure to satisfy CONSTANCY. In more recent work,22 he has given
these properties a role in his theory, calling them occurrent appearance properties.
The second candidate is the family of properties like being disposed to cause G
experiences in some kind of observer. These dispositional properties are the ones that
Shoemaker endorses. 23 Like the first proposal, this seems to satisfy DIFFERENCE,
CORRECTNESS, and SAMENESS. Unlike the first proposal, it also satisfies
CONSTANCY, since the dispositions are still present even when Kermit is not being
observed. There's a bit of a worry about NOVELTY: these properties look a lot like the
ones that dispositional theorists of color want to identify with the colors. More on this
later.
Unsurprisingly, it doesn't deliver CONTRARINESS; PG and PR still aren't
contraries, since things can be disposed to cause G experiences in one kind of perceiver
and R experiences in another. But this isn't a fatal problem. Perhaps we ought to give up
on CONTRARINESS, since it seems to be incompatible with the more important
requirement of CORRECTNESS. Still, if there were a proposal that would make
CORRECTNESS and CONTRARINESS compatible, that would be preferable.
22 Shoemaker (forthcoming).
23 As of Shoemaker (2000). Shoemaker (2001, forthcoming) assign a role to both candidate families of
properties.
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There is another problem with Shoemaker's dispositional candidates. Take the
property PG, which is, on Shoemaker's (2000) account, the property, being disposed to
cause G experiences in some kind ofperceiver. There are two readings of this: being
disposed to cause G experiences in some possible kind of perceiver, and being disposed
to cause G experiences in some actual kind of perceiver.24
There is trouble if Shoemaker opts for the first reading. Almost everything will
be disposed to cause G experiences in some kind of perceiver or other. All it will take to
be PG is to be potentially causally efficacious. But it would be nice if the property that
Ernie's visual experience (and not Vert's) represents Kermit as having did more than rule
out the possibility that Kermit is necessarily epiphenomenal. Kermit is fond of telling us
that it's not easy being green. Surely it's not that much easier to be phenomenal green.
There is also a more principled worry in the neighborhood. It's not just too easy
to be PG. It's also too easy to be PR. In fact, it's exactly as easy to be PR as it is to be
PG. Not only will all and only the potentially causally efficacious things be PG, but all
and only the potentially causally efficacious things will be PR, as well. This gives us the
unfortunate result that, necessarily, something is PG if and only if it's PR. On the
plausible view that necessarily coextensive properties are identical, it will turn out that
PG is PR. But then the whole strategy collapses. If PG is PR, then we lose
DIFFERENCE-Ernie and Vert aren't representing Kermit as having different
24 Terminological point: it's plausible that kinds are properties, and so the kinds might exist necessarily. So
it's best to read 'actual kind' and 'possible kind' as 'actually instantiated kind' and 'possibly instantiated
kind'. But this is awkward to write, so I'll continue to write 'actual kind' and 'possible kind' in the text,
with the understanding that these may be read in the more careful way described above.
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properties, and so we haven't found a representational difference to ground the
phenomenal difference in their visual experiences.
25
So Shoemaker should opt for the reading that says that PG is the property, being
disposed to cause G experiences in some actual kind of observer. 26 This reading, too, is
ambiguous. This time the ambiguity comes from two available readings of 'actual'. On
the first reading, something is PG at a world w iff it's disposed to cause G experiences in
some kind of observer that exists in @, where @ is the actual world. Call the properties
we get on this reading the dispositional@ properties, and the proposal the dispositional@
proposal. On the second disambiguation, something is PG at a world w iff it's disposed
to cause G experiences in some kind of observer that exists in w. Call these properties
the dispositionalw properties, and the proposal the dispositionalw proposal.
The difference between the two disambiguations is in the force of the word
'actual'. On the first reading-the dispositional@ proposal-the force of 'actual' is to
restrict the relevant kinds of observers to ones that exist in our world. On the second
reading-the dispositionalw proposal-the force of 'actual' is to restrict the relevant kinds
to ones that exist in the world where the object is. (The reader may have noticed a
connection to discussions of two-dimensionalism here. The dispositional@ proposal
25 The view that necessarily coextensive properties are identical is plausible, but it's not mandatory. Still,
two points: First, a difference only with respect to which finer-grained properties are represented still won't
deliver a difference in pure representational properties. Second, it doesn't seem as if we want this kind of
consideration to motivate our choice of a theory of properties. It would be better to have an account that
was neutral between theories of properties.
26 Another possible response: there's a difference in which modes of presentation of PG (that is, PR) they
employ. But if you're going to move to modes of presentation here, you might as well appeal to them right
away, and explain the intentional difference between Ernie and Vert as a difference in which modes of
presentation of being green they employ. (See Chalmers (forthcoming) for this kind of proposal.) The
move to appearance properties doesn't seem to have any work to do once we've got modes of presentation
in the picture.
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corresponds to the horizontal reading of 'actual', while the dispositionalw proposal
corresponds to the diagonal reading. 27)
There are two reasons why the dispositional@ proposal cannot be right. First,
even if this move does keep PG and PR from being necessarily coextensive, it's just by
luck. If there are enough kinds (or just the wrong kinds) of observers in the actual world,
then it will still turn out that PG and PR are necessarily coextensive. In some worlds
there are enough different kinds of observers that everything that's potentially causally
efficacious is disposed to cause G experiences in some kind of observer that exists there,
and also to cause R experiences in some kind of observer that exists there. If the actual
world is one of these, then PG and PR will be necessarily coextensive.
In other worlds, there are only observers like Ernie and observers like Vert. If the
actual world is one of these, then again PG and PR will be necessarily coextensive. An
object is disposed to cause G experiences in Ernie iff it's disposed to cause R experiences
in Vert, and vice versa. So if the actual world has only two kinds of observers, and
they're spectrum inverted relative to each other, an object will be disposed to cause G
experiences in some actual kind of observer iff it's also disposed to cause R experiences
in some actual kind of observer. And so PG and PR will be necessarily coextensive, and
so very plausibly identical, and so we won't have a representational difference.
We should not adopt a proposal that only works if the contingent facts about what
kinds of perceivers there actually are turn out the right way. A solution to the conflict
between intentionalism and the possibility of spectrum inversion ought to be general-
27 See for example Davies and Humberstone (1980), Stalnaker (1978), Chalmers (1996), Jackson (1998).
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whether or not it's viable ought not to hinge on these kinds of contingent facts about
which kinds of perceivers there happen to be. 28
The second reason why this reading fails is that it delivers the wrong results for
merely counterfactual spectrum inversion. Suppose that (as I imagine is true) the case of
Ernie and Vert is counterfactual, and that there isn't any actual spectrum inversion-
there aren't any actual observers that have R experiences when they look at green things.
Then Vert is of a kind that doesn't exist in @. Kermit will be PG, because he's disposed
to cause G experiences in us and we're (obviously) of an actually existing kind. But
Kermit won't be PR, because while he's disposed to cause R experiences in Vert, Vert is
not of any actually existing kind. So we haven't satisfied CORRECTNESS. Vert's
visual experience (in w) represents Kermit as being PR, but this is a misrepresentation,
since Kermit's not disposed to cause R experiences in any kind of observer that exists in
@. So on this reading, we can accommodate actual cases of spectrum inversion, but not
counterfactual cases. But spectrum inversion cases don't need to be actual to demand
proper treatment. We need a theory that gets the right results for both actual and merely
possible cases. 2 9
What about the dispositionalw reading-the one that says that something is PG in
w iff it's disposed to cause G experiences in observers of a kind that has instances in w?
A problem with this reading is that it gives the wrong results about the appearance
properties of things in counterfactual situations. Take some uncooked lobster in a
28 Again, an appeal to modes of presentation might look promising here. See note 26 for why I think this
isn't a good idea.
29 Another problem: we also lose the plausibility of SAMENESS for me and my counterfactual inverted
counterpart. It's extremely implausible that inverted-Egan, looking at Kermit's local (presumably still
green) counterpart in some counterfactual world w and having an R experience, is representing things as
being disposed to cause R experiences in some kind of observer that exists in @. That is, it's extremely
implausible that his visual experience represents Kermit as having the appearance property that, according
to the dispositional@ proposal, my experience represents ripe tomatoes as having.
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counterfactual world w. Call him Lenny. Lenny is green, and we're not spectrum
inverted, so he's disposed to cause G experiences in us. So he's PG. Or at least, he
ought to be PG. If something's PG in w iff it's disposed to cause G experiences in some
kind of observer that exists in w, then Lenny won't be PG in worlds where there aren't
any observers like us. 30 And this is implausible. If something's disposed to cause G
experiences in us-if, were we to look at it, we'd have a G experience-that ought to be
sufficient for it's being PG. The second reading doesn't deliver this result.
This is a lot less bad than the problems for the dispositional@ reading-if we're
going to go with a dispositional story, we should definitely go with this one. It delivers a
somewhat strange result about the appearance properties of merely possible things, but
it's not clear how big of a problem this really is. The more serious problem is that it
doesn't deliver CONTRARINESS. On the face of it, this is also not such a big deal,
because no proposal is going to give us CONTRARINESS-it's in direct conflict with
CORRECTNESS, which is non-negotiable. It turns out, though, that we can get both
CONTRARINESS and CORRECTNESS.
5. Self-Locating Content and Centering Features
Recall the discussion of centering features in the preceding chapter. Centering
features are the analogues of properties at the level of centered-worlds content. While
properties are functions from (at least) worlds to extensions, centering features are
functions from centered worlds to extensions. This is a natural way to describe such
features as, for example, being nearby.
3o Let's suppose that lobsters' visual phenomenology, if any, is such that other (uncooked) lobsters aren't
disposed to cause G experiences in them.
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Two things about centering features should be pretty clear: First, they're useful
things to have around for describing centered-worlds contents. In the same way that it's
useful to talk about the properties that people attribute to things in describing their beliefs
about which world is actual (try specifying the content of my belief that Kermit is green
without appealing to properties), it's useful to talk about the centering features that
people attribute to things in describing their self-locating beliefs (beliefs about which
predicament they're in). Second, there's nothing mysterious about them. Properties are
one kind of set theoretical object-functions from worlds to extensions-and centering
features are set-theoretical objects of another, analogous kind-functions from centered
worlds to extensions. 31
If we grant that we should take the contents of at least some kinds of
representation to be sets of centered worlds rather than sets of worlds (as seems
incredibly plausible), then a third point becomes clear: A difference in the attribution of
centering features is a representational difference. If I my beliefs represent Oakland as
nearby and yours represent it as far away, then there's a difference in the representational
content of our beliefs. This suggests a new set of candidates to be the appearance
properties: perhaps Ernie and Vert differ in which centering features they attribute to
Kermit. I will develop this proposal in the next section.
31 Or at least they stand in some very intimate relation to such set-theoretic objects. The identity claims are
more controversial. But even if the identity claims are false, centering features don't seem to be any more
mysterious than properties.
-98-
I__~_·_·II_ _I_· _ ~__·_____  _ · ____II I~__pl______i
~CIII~Pl~gY-~lgl- -- ~·UI --·~-iXill·---·---~ L·lil~I-l~rm-i-
Appearance Properties?
6. Appearance Properties as Centering features
Here is a first pass at a proposal for what PG is: it's the centering feature, being
disposed to cause G experiences in me (or possibly, being disposed to cause G
experiences in perceivers of my kind). 32,33
It is important not to 'read through' the indexical. It's tempting to understand the
claim that Ernie's visual experience attributes the centering feature, being disposed to
cause G experiences in me to Kermit as the claim that Ernie's visual experience attributes
the property, being disposed to cause G experiences in Ernie to Kermit. But this would
be a mistake. It's important that the centering feature, being disposed to cause G
experiences in me, is something that combines with an object to determine a centered-
worlds proposition, not a possible-worlds proposition. 34 It's also important that it's
something that Ernie's visual experience represents Kermit, limes, and uncooked lobsters
as having, and that Vert's visual experience represents ripe tomatoes, fire engines, and
cooked lobsters as having. The property that we get by 'reading through' the indexical in
a given case doesn't have either of these features.35
This meets all of the desiderata and avoids all of the problems of the other
accounts. Let's look at each desideratum in turn:
DIFFERENCE: PG is plainly not the same centering feature as PR. The set of
possible predicaments in which Kermit is disposed to cause G experiences in me (or in
32 It's a first pass because, for reasons we'll get to in a moment, it can't be quite right as it stands.
33 Of course we also get the occurrent versions-is causing a G experience in me now. So if (as Shoemaker
does in more recent work) we want to appeal to both occurrent and dispositional appearance properties, we
can still do that.
34 That is, it's important that it combine with an object to determine an interesting centered-worlds
roposition, to go back to the terminology of note n again.
As a consequence, these properties are also bad candidates to be the appearance properties. Their
prominent defect is that they don't satisfy SAMENESS.
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observers of my kind) is clearly not the same as the set in which he is disposed to cause R
experiences in me (or observers of my kind). So DIFFERENCE is satisfied.36
CORRECTNESS: Neither Ernie nor Vert is misrepresenting Kermit-Kermit
really is disposed to cause G experiences in Ernie, and he really is disposed to cause R
experiences in Verti-so CORRECTNESS is satisfied.
NOVELTY: If we agree that Ernie's and Vert's experiences agree on their color
content, then these centering features can't be the colors. Also, it seems quite plausible
(though it's not universally agreed to) that the colors of things are perfectly objective
properties of them, and that which colors things have is not observer-relative.
If we thought that the colors of things were observer-relative, then we shouldn't
have been worried in the first place-we should have resisted the claim that it was
possible to have spectrum inverted subjects whose visual experiences agreed on the
colors of things.
SAMENESS: The centering feature that Ernie's visual experience attributes to
Kermit (and to unripe tomatoes) is the same one that Vert's attributes to, e.g., cooked
lobsters and ripe tomatoes.
CONTRARINESS: When Ernie learns that Kermit is PG, he learns that he's not
PR (just as when he learns that San Francisco is far away, he learns that it's not nearby).
So CONTRARINESS is satisfied, as well.
This is compatible with Vert, when he learns that Kermit is PR, learning that he's
not PG (just as Vert could, if he lived in Oakland, learn that San Francisco is not far away
by learning that it's nearby). In the case of centering features (like nearby and far away),
36 We probably also need an 'in present circumstances' qualification.
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unlike in the case of properties (like green and red), CONTRARINESS and
CORRECTNESS are compatible.
CONSTANCY: They're dispositions, so there's no problem about Kermit's
having them even when he's not being observed.
I conclude that centering features are the best candidates to play the appearance-
property role. If we are going to go in for a Shoemaker-style solution to the conflict
between intentionalism and the possibility of spectrum inversion, we should say that the
representational difference that grounds the phenomenal difference between inverted
subjects is a difference with respect to which centering features (of the kind described
above) are represented by their visual experiences.
Unfortunately there is a lingering problem about deviant dispositions (pointed out
to me by Alex Byrne). Suppose that Kermit was, in addition to having his usual effects
on Ernie's perceptual system, was also disposed to cause Ernie to hallucinate a ripe
tomato hovering in the air three feet to Kermit's left. This would be strange, but it's
certainly not impossible. In this case, two bad things would happen. First, Ernie would
correct in representing Kermit as PR, since Kermit really would be disposed to cause R
experiences in Ernie. This is bad, because only red things ought to be PR to non-inverted
observers. Second, Ernie would be correct in representing Kermit as both PR and PG,
(since he really is disposed to cause both G and R experiences in Ernie), which shows
that the first pass proposal doesn't really give us CONTRARINESS.
Two strategies for revising the first pass proposal to avoid this problem suggest
themselves. First, we could say that something is PG iff it's disposed to cause G
experiences in me in a non-deviant way, and start looking for some halfway satisfying
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way of cashing out 'non-deviant'. Second, we could say something quite a bit fancier
about what it is that PG things are supposed to do-if we're fans of visual fields, the
thing to say is something like, an object is PG iff it's disposed to cause the bit of the
visual field responsible for representing it to go green'. I suspect that it is possible to
make good on this sort of proposal without actually committing oneself to green' patches
on visual fields (by talking about very specific phenomenal properties of experiences and
the relations of similarity between them), but I won't argue for that here.
7. Another Constraint, and a Big Problem
Centering features are the best candidates to play the appearance-property role,
but are they good enough candidates? There's another non-negotiable constraint on what
the appearance properties can be like, which I've suppressed so far because it generates a
pretty serious problem-maybe nothing can play the role appearance properties were
introduced to play. 37
NECESSITY: The connection between appearance property content and phenomenal
character must be necessary.
To use Byrne and Hilbert's (1997b) phrases, the connection between a visual
experiences being 'PG-feeling' and its being 'PG-representing' must be necessary.
Otherwise-if the connection between an experience's representing something as being
PG and its having the phenomenal character distinctive of our experiences of green things
37 Actually, the constraint is entailed by SAMENESS, but it's also independently motivated, and while the
stronger claim of SAMENESS isn't quite non-negotiable, this one is.
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(call this phenomenal character G) were contingent-there could be another, higher-order
spectrum inversion problem. If the connection between appearance property content and
phenomenal character were contingent, we could, for example, have two subjects, both of
whose visual experiences represent Kermit as being PG, but whose visual experiences
have different phenomenal character. If this kind of case is possible, then we've made no
progress-we've again got Ernie and Vert having experiences with the same content, but
different phenomenal character.
Given a plausible extemrnalism, it could happen that some perceiver auditorily
represents things as being PG. (This might happen if, for example, all and only the things
that are disposed to cause G experiences.., make a certain noise when struck.) In this
case, representation of PG wouldn't go along with phenomenal character G. We can
avoid this problem by moving, as we probably already need to do, from pure
intentionalism to a modality-specific pure intentionalism. It's more plausible that visually
representing something as PG always goes along with G. But it's not certain-maybe all
and only PG things cause R experiences in certain nonstandard viewing conditions, for
example.
This is potentially a very serious problem for any proposal that attempts to
dissolve the tension between intentionalism and the possibility of spectrum inversion by
adding a further layer of content. If the connection between representing the properties in
the extra layer and the phenomenal character of experience is contingent, then we won't
have made any progress. But it's hard to see how it could be necessary-we have to rule
out the possibility of any phenomenally nonstandard ways of representing the appearance
properties. And while, given the nature of appearance properties (or appearance features)
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like PG, it's quite plausible that having a visual experience with a certain phenomenal
character is sufficient for representing something as having PG, it's harder to see why it's
necessary. And it had better be necessary, or else we'll have PG-representing
experiences that don't have G, and we'll still have a counterexample to intentionalism.
I point out this problem only to set it aside-important as they are to the viability
of the whole Shoemakerian project, I won't address general questions about the
satisfiabilty of NECESSITY here. All that I will say is that the candidates that I've
proposed have at least as good a claim to satisfy it as Shoemaker's do.3 8 Discussion of
just how good any of those claims are will need to be left for another occasion. So my
conclusion is conditional: if you're going to go in for a Shoemaker-type strategy, then
you should say that the extra features represented in Ernie's and Vert's visual experience
are centering features. For these reasons, though, I'm hesitant about claiming that a
Shoemaker-type strategy is the best way to go.
Conclusion
Appearance properties were introduced to play a certain role. They're supposed
to mark a difference in how spectrum inverted subjects represent colored objects like
Kermit. I've argued that the best candidates to play this role aren't properties, but
centering features. So while it's not clear whether or not there are any appearance
properties-since while there are things that play the role, those things aren't
properties-the intentionalist should be happy. There is a representational difference
between Ernie and Vert: their visual experiences attribute different centering features to
38 Actually, I suspect they have a better claim, since it seems more plausible to me that representation of
centering features is intrinsic than that representation of properties. But I won't argue for that here.
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Kermit. And as far as reconciling intentionalism with the possibility of spectrum
inversion without misrepresentation goes, it's just the presence of the representational
difference, and not the details of what kind of difference it is, that matters.
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